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We estimate holdings of highly-rated tranches of mortgage securitizations of American deposit-taking
banks ahead of the credit crisis and evaluate hypotheses that have been advanced to explain these holdings.
We find that holdings of highly-rated tranches were economically trivial for the typical bank, but banks
with greater holdings performed more poorly during the crisis. Though   univariate comparisons show
that banks with large trading books had greater holdings, the holdings of highly-rated tranches are
not higher for banks with large trading books in regressions that control for bank size. The ratio of
highly-rated tranches holdings to assets increases with bank assets, but not for banks with more than
$50 billion of assets. This evidence is inconsistent with explanations for holdings of highly-rated tranches
that emphasize the incentives of banks deemed “too-big-to-fail”. Further, the evidence does not provide
support for “bad incentives” theories of holdings of highly-rated tranches. We find, however, that banks
active in securitization held more highly-rated tranches. Such a result can be consistent with regulatory
arbitrage as well as with securitizing banks holding highly-rated tranches to convince investors of
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So-called toxic assets held by U.S. financial institutions were at the heart of the recent financial crisis. 
A mainstream view of the role of these assets is that their loss in value led financial institutions to have 
low capital, which forced them to raise more capital, to cut back on making loans, and to engage in fire 
sales (see Brunnermeier (2009)). The most visible and controversial policy initiative of the U.S. Treasury 
to deal with the crisis, TARP, started as an attempt to fund the purchase of toxic assets from banks. 
Though a vigorous debate has been taking place on why banks held these assets, to our knowledge, there 
is no systematic investigation of the various theories that have been advanced to explain these holdings. 
In this paper, we estimate bank holdings of assets that became toxic and investigate which of the various 
theories advanced to explain these holdings are consistent with the empirical evidence.   
At least in the early phases of the crisis, the bulk of the assets that are considered to have become 
toxic were highly-rated securities issued in securitizations involving subprime and alt-A mortgages. This 
definition includes AAA, AA, and A tranches of ABSs as well as CDOs. For short, we will call these 
securities highly-rated securitization tranches. Banks made other losses; in particular, they made losses on 
non-prime mortgages and on highly levered loans held on their books. However, early on, the largest 
write-downs came from mark-to-market losses on highly-rated securitization tranches. For instance, in Q4 
2007 Citibank had write-downs of $18 billion. All but $1 billion of these write-downs came directly or 
indirectly from highly-rated tranches of securitizations.
1   
Traditionally, banks were institutions that made loans financed by deposits. More recently, banks 
have  been  implementing  an  originate-to-distribute  model,  where  they  originate  loans  and  sell  them 
through securitizations. Before the crisis, it was widely believed that the originate-to-distribute model 
would  make  banks  safer  and  reduce  systemic  risk  (e.g.,  Greenspan  (2004)).  However,  a  substantial 
fraction  of  securities  issued  through  securitizations did  not  leave  the  banking  system  and  eventually 
became the banks’ most notorious toxic assets. In trying to understand why the subprime losses were 
followed by a long-lasting financial crisis while stock market losses from the crash of 1987 that were of 
roughly  similar  magnitude  were  not,  economists  have  argued  that  the  key  difference  between  the 
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subprime crisis and the stock market crash is that the subprime crisis led to large bank losses through the 
securities that they retained from securitizations while the crash of 1987 did not lead to significant bank 
losses (see Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) for this comparison).  For instance, Acharya, Schnabl, and 
Suarez (2010) summarize their view of the origin of the crisis by stating that “banks increasingly devised 
securitization methods that allowed them to concentrate risks on their balance sheets which eventually led 
to the largest banking crisis since the Great Depression.”  
Though investment banks eventually reported information on their holdings of highly-rated tranches, 
they did not have reporting requirements that make it possible to consistently identify such holdings 
before the crisis. It is possible to estimate subsets of holdings of highly-rated tranches for individual 
investment banks that are not part of bank holding companies for 2006 or 2007 based on their disclosures. 
We provide such estimates in a separate section and discuss their implications for our analysis. For bank 
holding companies, we are able to construct estimates of holdings of such securities from 2002 to 2008. 
These estimates involve some crucial assumptions. However, our various approaches to estimate these 
holdings  give  similar  overall  results.  Strikingly,  there  is  large  variation  in  holdings  of  highly-rated 
tranches across banks. The median holdings of highly-rated tranches normalized by total assets are less 
than 0.2%. Obviously, for the typical bank, these holdings were not material. The mean across banks was 
about 1.3% in 2006. Again, average holdings of highly-rated tranches across banks were not threatening. 
Banks with large trading portfolios (more than $1 billion of trading assets and trading assets representing 
more than 10% of total assets) had higher holdings, as the average for these banks represented about 5% 
of assets as of 2006. We would expect holdings of highly-rated tranches to be negatively related to bank 
performance during the crisis. We find that this is the case.  
We identify a number of possible determinants of the holdings of highly-rated tranches from the 
ongoing debate as to why banks held these tranches. These determinants are not mutually exclusive. All 
determinants could affect the holdings of a particular bank. The most important determinants that have 
been discussed are: 3 
 
A)  Securitization business by-products. Banks engaged in securitization hold some of the securities 
they create through the process of creating and marketing these securities. In addition, banks had 
to have skin in the game (Shleifer and Vishny (2010), Gennaioli, Shleifer, and Vishny (2011)).  
B)  Regulatory arbitrage. Banks could hold the highest-rated tranches of securitizations with lower 
regulatory capital than the underlying loans, making it advantageous for them to hold loans in the 
form of securitizations (see Acharya and Richardson (2009) among others). They could also hold 
these tranches in off-balance sheet conduits and structured investment vehicles (SIVs), where the 
capital requirements were even less (Acharya, Schnabl, and Suarez (2010)). However, as the 
value of these tranches held in SIVs fell, some banks had to take them on their balance sheet.
2  
C)  Bad incentives within the firm. The argument made is that banks had inappropriate incentive 
systems that made it advantageous for managers and/or traders to take excessive risks (e.g., Rajan 
(2010)), such as investing in assets that subsequently became toxic. This argument is summed up 
by Blinder as follows: “Give smart people go-for-broke incentives and they will go for broke. 
Duh.”
3 In some cases, these bad incentives might have been the result of internal accounting 
mechanisms and/or economic capital attribution that did not properly account for the cost of 
holding these highly-rated tranches (see UBS (2008)). These securities had a higher yield than 
other highly-rated securities such as Treasuries or agency MBSs, which made their holdings 
advantageous, at least in the short term, for some types of bonus schemes. In addition, some argue 
that  fees  generated  through  the  securitization  activities  created  incentives  for  executives  to 
securitize too many assets. According to this view, executives involved in these securitizations 
benefited from making deals rather than from placing them, in which case the bank would be 
stuck with tranches that could not be sold.  
                                                           
2 See, for instance, “Citi finalizes SIV wind-down by agreeing to purchase all remaining assets,” Citigroup Inc., 
November 19, 2008. In that release, Citi announced that “it has committed to acquire the remaining assets of the 
SIVs at their current fair value, estimated to be approximately $17.4 billion.” 
3 See Alan S. Blinder, Crazy compensation and the crisis, The Wall Street Journal, May 28, 2009. Fahlenbrach and 
Stulz  (2011)  show,  however,  that  banks  whose  CEOs  had  incentives  better  aligned  with  those  of  the  other 
shareholders did not perform better during the crisis. 4 
 
D)  Good deals. The yields of highly-rated tranches of securitizations were higher than the yields of 
comparably  rated  securities.  Consequently,  it  is  possible  that  managers  held  these  securities 
because they thought they were good deals. A related hypothesis is the hypothesis that market 
participants did not, in general, assess risks correctly because of biases (see Gennaioli, Shleifer, 
and Vishny (2011) for a model) or for other reasons, such as models that turned out to be flawed 
even though at the time they were believed to be valid.  
E)  Too big to fail. The argument is that banks that are assessed to be too big to fail have a lower cost 
of funds for risky assets because the market does not expect them to be allowed to fail (Carbo-
Valverde, Kane, and Rodriguez-Fernandez (2010)). Therefore, these banks can make profits from 
investing in risky assets as doing so does not increase their cost of funding to the same extent it 
would  for  a  bank  that  is  not  too  big  to  fail.  From  this  perspective,  highly-rated  tranches  of 
securitizations  would  have  been  risky  securities  that  such  banks  would  have  found  to  be 
profitable to hold. Because of how they are engineered, these securities pay off fully in most 
states of the world, but pay the least in states of the world where public support of financial 
institutions is most likely, namely in systemic crises.       
 
These  various  explanations  for  holdings  of  highly-rated  securitization  tranches  advanced  in  the 
finance literature as well as by observers in general are not mutually exclusive. It could be that for each 
explanation there is a subset of banks for which the explanation is the main reason these banks held 
highly-rated tranches. In this paper, we investigate whether any of these explanations helps explain the 
cross-sectional distribution of holdings of highly-rated tranches across banks just before the crisis.  
In  the  next  section,  we  develop  these  possible  explanations  for  banks’  holdings  of  highly-rated 
tranches and develop the testable implications of each theory. In Section 2, we explain how we construct 
our estimates for highly-rated tranches for depository banks and summarize these estimates. In Section 3, 
we investigate whether the performance of banks during the credit crisis is related to our estimates of their 
holdings of highly-rated tranches. We test the implications of the various theories in Section 4. In Section 5 
 
5, we provide estimates of highly-rated tranches in 2006 or 2007 for the four large investment banks that 
were not bank holding companies. We conclude in Section 6. 
 
Section 1. Theories of Holdings of Highly-Rated Tranches. 
In Fama (1985), banks’ cost of funding is a market cost of funding, but banks face a cost of doing 
business, the cost of the reserves they have to maintain, which means that to remain in business they have 
to charge an above-market rate to their lenders. This well-known result poses a paradox when considering 
banks’ holdings of highly-rated tranches. If banks pay a market rate of return on their sources of finance 
and earn a market rate of return on their investments in securities, how can it be a positive NPV project 
for banks to hold securities? Whereas it is intuitive that a bank might monitor lenders and that this 
monitoring  could  create  value,  there  is  nothing  intuitive  about  the  notion  that  securities  are  more 
efficiently held by banks than by investors.  
In the context of Fama (1985), if a bank believes that securities are properly priced, we would only 
expect it to hold securities to address unexpected liquidity demands from depositors and borrowers or as 
part of an inventory if it makes a market in these securities. However, the value of securities held as a 
liquidity buffer should be positively correlated with liquidity shocks rather than negatively. As a result, 
we would expect banks to hold safe securities for liquidity purposes or even, if possible, securities that 
have high payoffs in states of the world with a systemic liquidity shock. From this perspective, holdings 
of highly-rated tranches for liquidity purposes makes sense only if these securities were viewed as safe 
assets robust to systemic liquidity shocks. We would expect there to be economies of scale in the size of 
the liquidity buffer as liquidity demands on a large bank would be more predictable than on a small bank. 
Banks without a trading book would not make a market in these securities and hence would be expected 
to have smaller holdings of such assets. 
We now consider the five groups of determinants of holdings of highly-rated tranches discussed in the 
introduction and derive testable hypotheses.  
  6 
 
1.A. Securitization by-product. 
Investors  in  securitization  tranches  know  that  the  issuer  has  better  information  about  the  assets 
securitized than they do. This information asymmetry leads to discounting of the tranches. To reduce this 
discounting,  the  issuer  can  signal  the  quality  of  the  assets  by  holding  some  of  the  securities  issued 
alongside outside investors. In general, we would expect that it would be most efficient for issuers to have 
skin in the game in the form of the riskiest tranches, so that they would be the first to bear losses. 
However, holding the riskiest tranches is extremely expensive in terms of capital requirements. Therefore, 
banks that do not have slack in regulatory capital are more likely to hold highly-rated tranches. Further, 
the fraction of tranches that were highly rated in securitizations was extremely large (typically more than 
70%), so that holding such tranches was a way for banks to convince investors that these tranches were 
good investments. Highest-rated tranches were also purchased by different sets of institutional investors 
(e.g.,  pension  funds)  than  the  lowest-rated  tranches  were  (e.g.,  hedge  funds).  Though  banks  held 
securitization tranches voluntarily, the Dodd-Frank Act, Section 939A, mandates regulations that oblige 
issuers to have “skin-in-the-game.” A bank that is active in the securitization market as an issuer has a 
pipeline of deals. If it produces CDOs, it will have an inventory of ABSs. As it issues ABSs and CDOs, it 
will have tranches that it sells immediately and others that it does not. It may make a market for tranches. 
Consequently, we would expect holdings of highly-rated tranches to increase over time as securitization 
activity increases. However, banks may also be stuck with highly-rated tranches that they cannot sell. As 
securitization activity slowed in 2007, holdings of highly-rated tranches should have increased to the 
extent  that  banks  found  it  difficult  to  sell  these  tranches  but  failed  to  stop  their  production  quickly 
enough. Therefore, we have the following predictions:   
 
(Securitization H1; activity) Holdings of highly-rated tranches as a fraction of a bank’s assets were 
higher for banks engaged in securitization activity.  
(Securitization  H2;  cumulative  activity)  Holdings  of  highly-rated  tranches  for  banks  active  in 
securitization increased over time as each securitization would require skin in the game.  7 
 
(Securitization H3; end-of-game) Holdings of highly-rated tranches for banks active in securitization 
increased in 2007 to the extent that securitization activity did not slow down fast enough and banks 
were stuck with highly-rated tranches that they intended to sell.  
 
1.B. Regulatory arbitrage. 
Banks that do not have regulatory capital slack will always choose to organize their activities in a way 
that, everything else equal, minimizes the use of regulatory capital. U.S. capital regulations, starting in 
2002, reduced the capital requirement for banks holding highly-rated tranches. Before the change in 
regulation, banks holding highly-rated tranches had to set aside 8% regulatory capital if these securities 
were not held in the bank’s trading book. The trading book was subject to different regulatory capital 
requirements and these capital requirements were less onerous. Strikingly, with the regulations introduced 
in 2002, a bank that made subprime loans was better off to hold them on its books as securities issued 
against the subprime loans as collateral than holding the loans directly.
4  Further, the bank was even better 
off holding the securities in an off-balance sheet conduit or SIV.  It is important to note, however, that 
regulatory arbitrage made it advantageous for banks to hold highly-rated tranches of securitizations if they 
benefitted  from  making  the  loans  used  as  collateral  in  the  first  place  since,  otherwise,  the  more 
advantageous  treatment  of  highly-rated  tranches  did  not  make  them  positive  NPV  projects.  These 
regulatory capital benefits would not have been consequential for banks with a large excess amount of 
regulatory capital. In addition, small banks would not have found it beneficial to use securitization to 
reduce regulatory capital charges because of the fixed costs of securitization. Finally, with the start of the 
financial crisis, conduits and SIVs ran into trouble and some of their assets came back on the balance 
sheets of the bank sponsors.  
Banks differ in the extent to which they optimize their use of regulatory capital. While some banks 
have large amounts of excess regulatory capital, others do not. Their business model makes it optimal for 
some banks to have more economic capital than regulatory capital. However, it is also possible that some 
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banks are more intent in maximizing the size of their balance sheet for a given amount of regulatory 
capital. For assets with low capital charges, the highly-rated tranches were attractive because they had a 
higher yield than other assets with similar capital charges as they had more systematic risk (see Iannotta 
and Pennacchi (2011)). We would expect banks that were more intent on taking advantage of regulatory 
arbitrage  opportunities to have  grown  their  balance sheet  when  capital  requirements  for  highly-rated 
tranches changed in 2002.  
It follows that: 
 
(Regulatory Arbitrage H1) Banks that are more constrained in regulatory capital and larger banks 
have greater holdings of highly-rated tranches as a fraction of assets.  
(Regulatory  Arbitrage  H2)  Banks  that  engage  in  more  regulatory  arbitrage  activities  have  more 
highly-rated tranches.  
 
1.C. Bad incentives.  
Rajan (2006) raised concerns about the incentives in place in the financial industry and how they 
might lead to excessive risk-taking even before the crisis. A key characteristic of highly-rated tranches 
before the financial crisis is that they had a higher yield than similar highly-rated assets. Such a difference 
can arise in efficient markets simply because some assets have more systematic risk than others. For 
instance, these assets might have poor returns when the economy performs particularly poorly (see Coval 
and Stafford (2009)). If incentives are set properly, executives or traders should not benefit from investing 
in correctly priced assets that have a higher return only because they have more systematic risk. However, 
if incentives are set improperly, it is possible for executives or traders to benefit from profits generated by 
investing  in  such  assets.  First,  traders  whose  performance  is  judged  on  P&L  taking  into  account 
regulatory capital used and the cost of funds of the bank have incentives to invest in highly-rated tranches 
since their P&L increases by the positive carry of these assets and charges for regulatory capital are low. 
Second, executives whose performance is assessed by the ROE of their bank also benefit from investing 9 
 
in highly-rated tranches as long as the yield on these securities exceeds the cost of holding these assets. 
Therefore, we have the following predictions: 
 
(Bad  incentives  H1)  Banks  with  trading  operations  and  poor  incentives  have  more  highly-rated 
tranches.  
(Bad incentives H2) Banks more focused on ROE hold more highly-rated tranches. 
 
1.D. Good deals.   
A possible explanation for holdings of highly-rated tranches is that bank managers thought that they 
were good deals in the sense that they were investments with high risk-adjusted expected returns. They 
could have thought that the higher yield of these securities compared to securities of similar rating was 
due to market mispricing, that the higher yield was compensation for the complexity of the securities, or 
that compensation for systematic risk that they felt was overstated. Managers could have believed that 
they were well-equipped to assess these securities, so that they did not have to be compensated to hold 
them. Irrespective of why the banks felt that investing in these securities created value for shareholders, 
we would expect that managers with stronger incentives to create value for shareholders would hold more 
of these securities if they were generally perceived to be priced inefficiently and if investing in these 
securities required more effort than investing in more standard securities. With this view, we have the 
following hypothesis: 
 
(Good deal H1) Managers of banks that invest more in highly-rated tranches of securitizations have 
stronger incentives to maximize shareholder wealth.  
 
1.E. Too-big-to-fail.   
To the extent that a bank is viewed as too-big-to-fail, its cost of funds does not reflect the full extent 
of the risks it takes. The proponents of the too-big-to-fail view argue that, since a too-big-to-fail bank 10 
 
does not pay for some of the risks it takes, the bank has incentives to take more of the risks it does not 
fully pay for. If a bank that is viewed as too-big-to-fail is expected to be bailed out whenever it makes 
large losses, the bank can increase its value by generally taking more total risk. If, instead, such a bank is 
likely to be bailed out only in systemic crises, it has incentives to take on more risks that have poor 
payoffs in systemic crises. Highly-rated tranches of securitizations were not risky securities that banks 
would have used to increase their overall riskiness since these securities were designed to pay off fully in 
most states of the world. As a result, too-big-to-fail banks would have had incentives to hold highly-rated 
tranches only if too-big-to-fail is believed to imply a greater probability of being bailed out in a systemic 
crisis but not otherwise: 
 
(Too-big-to-fail  H1)  Banks  deemed  too-big-to-fail  invested  more  in  highly-rated  tranches  of 
securitizations than other banks.   
 
The too-big-to-fail hypothesis ignores the possibility that a too-big-to-fail bank could be subject to more 
regulatory scrutiny, so that it might be limited in its risk taking. Further, such a bank can have high 
franchise value, which also would limit its risk taking.  
  
Section 2. Estimated holdings of highly-rated tranches. 
In this section, we explain first how we estimate holdings of highly-rated tranches and then provide 
data on our estimates.  
 
2.1. Methods to estimate holdings of highly-rated tranches. 
Our  primary  data  source  is  the  Consolidated  Financial  Statements  for  Bank  Holding  Companies 
(BHCs), form FR Y-9C, published quarterly by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 
We focus on the cross-section of BHCs that are publicly traded in the United States and have data as of 
December 31, 2006. We drop all BHCs with missing data on total assets or with total assets less than $1 11 
 
billion and end with a final sample of 231 banks as of December 31, 2006, the period we focus on in the 
majority of our estimations.
5 The total sample period over which we calculate holdings of highly-rated 
tranches covers March 2002 through December 2008.  It starts in 2002 because this is the first year that 
capital requirements on securitization tranches were calculated based on credit ratings. 
Our variable of interest is designed to measure holdings of what we call highly-rated tranches, which 
are highly-rated non-government and non-agency securities issued in securitizations and held on BHC 
balance sheets. Examples include highly-rated tranches of subprime RMBSs, CMBSs, CLOs, CBOs and 
CDOs. Bank holding companies did not explicitly report holdings of these securities in their consolidated 
financial statements during our sample period.  Our approach is to “back out” the amount of highly-rated 
tranches  banks  held  on  their  balance  sheets  using  data  from  the  regulatory-capital  portion  of  the 
consolidated  financial  statements  (schedule  HC-R  of  the  form  FR  Y-9C).  Under  risk-based  capital 
guidelines, BHCs are required to hold regulatory capital against each asset, including securities, with the 
amount of capital determined by the type of the asset and/or the riskiness of the asset in the case of the 
securitization tranches. For example, government securities usually require zero risk-weighting while 
agency-sponsored  securities  are  generally  assigned  a  20%  risk  weight  by  virtue  of  their  implicit 
government guarantees. Securitization tranches with a credit rating of AA or AAA are assigned a 20% 
capital charge while tranches with credit ratings of A require a 50% capital charge.  
Our approach is to identify the amount of securities in the 20% and 50% risk-weight categories that 
are not government or agency-affiliated.  Reporting guidelines name the specific types of securities that 
are to be included in each risk weight category and instruct BHCs to account for securities at historical 
cost, as opposed to fair value. For example, the total amount of held-to-maturity securities (line item 35 in 
Schedule HC-R) in the 20% risk-weight category contains various securities issued or guaranteed by the 
                                                           
5 We drop BHCs that are not in the top tier of the multi-tiered BHCs to avoid double counting. We also drop 3 
BHCs that are insurance companies, 2 BHCs that are mortgage brokers, 2 BHCs that are credit card companies and 
one asset-management BHC that is an outlier in our sample. 12 
 
government or government-sponsored agencies and reported in Schedule HC-B.
6  The key to our measure 
of  highly-rated  tranches  is  that  BHCs  are  instructed  to  also  include,  “all  other  residential  MBS,” 
“commercial mortgage pass-through securities,” “other commercial MBS,” “asset-backed securities,” and 
“structured financial products” that represent the amortized cost of securities rated AAA or AA in this 
20% risk category.  Thus, the residual amount of securities included in the 20% risk category that are not 
affiliated with the government or government-sponsored agencies represent the amount of AAA or AA-
rated private-label structured debt held by BHCs. The instructions for assets to be included in the 50% 
risk category are similar but for A-rated securities. Taken together, the 20% risk-weighted residual and 
the  50%  risk-weighted  residual  represent  the  portion  of  highly-rated  (AAA,  AA,  or  A  rated)  non-
government,  non-agency  securities  held  on  BHC  balance  sheets.  In  other  words,  they  represent  the 
holdings of highly-rated tranches that we seek to measure. We provide the details of the construction of 
the residual measures, including the relevant FRY9-C codes, in data Appendix 1.     
Many of the highly-rated tranches with 20% or 50% risk weights are accounted for as available-for-
sale (AFS) or held-to-maturity (HTM) securities. However, some highly-rated tranches, especially in the 
case of the largest banks, are held separately in a BHC’s trading account.  Identifying these securities in 
the  trading  accounts  is  difficult  because,  for  regulatory-capital  purposes,  banks  with  large  trading 
operations do not report individual risk-weighted trading assets.
7 Rather, they compute a value-at-risk 
(VaR)  for  their  entire  trading  operation.  For  the  banks  that  are  subject  to  the  market  risk  capital 
guidelines, we are unable to use the residual approach to back out holdings of highly-rated tranches in 
trading books. To capture holdings of securitization tranches, we use the total amount of line items that 
are recorded as trading assets (in Schedule HC-D) and represent non-government, non-agency mortgage-
backed  securities.  This  approach  captures  the  private-label  securitization  tranches  with  mortgage 
                                                           
6 These securities are securities issued by government-sponsored agencies (line item 2b), residential mortgage pass-
through securities issued by FNMA and FHLMC (line item 4a2), securities issued by states or political subdivisions 
in the U.S. (Item 3), and other MBSs (collateralized by MBSs) issued or guaranteed by agencies (line items 4b1 
(line item 4b2)). 
7 Bank holding companies are subject to “market risk capital” guidelines if their trading assets exceed 10% of total 
assets or if their trading assets exceed $1 Billion.  13 
 
collateral in a BHC’s trading account, but without differentiating the credit quality of these securitization 
tranches.
8  Adding the securitization tranches from the trading account to the 20% and 50% AFS and 
HTM residual results in our primary measure of highly-rated tranches, which we refer to as the “Highly-
Rated Residual” hereafter. This measure overstates holdings of highly-rated tranches of MBSs because it 
includes lower-rated tranches held in the trading book, but it understates holdings of highly-rated tranches 
because the data available from the trading book does not include CDOs.  
Our primary analysis investigates the holdings of highly-rated tranches before the crisis started. We 
therefore focus on holdings as of December 31, 2006. Beginning in June 2008, BHCs have been required 
to explicitly report the amount of CDOs held in their trading accounts if the BHC reported a quarterly 
average  for  trading  assets  of  $1  billion  or  more  in  any  of  the  four  preceding  quarterly  reports.  We 
supplement  our  December  2006  estimates  of  highly-rated  tranches  by  adding  the  amount  of  CDOs 
reported in June 2008 to our first measure, “Highly-Rated Residual,” as of December 2006.
9  It is likely 
that the June 2008 values of CDOs under-report the value of CDOs held on BHCs’ balance sheets as of 
2006 because the value of CDOs were written down in the fall of 2007 and early 2008. To account for 
this possibility, we create another measure by adding the amount of CDO write-downs (downloaded from 
Bloomberg) for the time period December 31, 2006 through the June 30, 2008 to the June 2008 CDO 
totals for each of the relevant banks.  
In summary, our residual approach yields three separate measures of highly-rated tranches. The first 
is the “Highly-Rated Residual,” which includes 20% and 50% residuals as well as MBS Trading. The 
second measure, constructed to account for the CDOs held in trading assets, adds 2008 CDOs to our first 
measure (“Highly-Rated Residual + CDOs” hereafter). The third one, which also adds the CDO write-
downs, is named the “Highly-Rated Residual + CDOs and Writedowns.”   
                                                           
8 Nadauld and Sherlund (2010) show that over 80% of the value-weighted bonds in subprime RMBS deals received 
a AAA rating, with close to 90% rated at least A. Although we cannot use the residual approach to identify the 
holdings  of  highly-rated  tranches  in  trading  assets,  it  is  likely  that  these  securities  were  highly  rated.  This  is 
especially true in light of the fact that correlation traders in hedge funds were frequent purchasers of the lowest rated 
(residual) tranches in securitization deals.    
9 Only four banks in our final sample held enough CDOs in their trading portfolio to warrant explicit reporting of the 
amount in the June 2008 FR-Y9C.  14 
 
Our final measure of highly-rated tranches holdings, which we call the “Bottom-up Highly-Rated 
Tranches” measure, is borrowed from Cheng, Hong, and Scheinkman (2010). This measure is basically 
the sum of each line item from the AFS, HTM, and trading asset accounts that  corresponds to non-
government, non-agency sponsored securities. It includes “other mortgage-backed securities” and “asset-
backed securities” from the AFS and HTM securities (Schedule HC-B). Non-government, non-agency 
mortgage-backed  securities  from  trading  assets  (Schedule  HC-D)  are  also  added.    Data  Appendix  1 
provides the detailed data fields associated with the construction of this bottom-up measure. While the 
measure explicitly assesses the amount of non-government, non-agency securities held on BHCs’ balance 
sheets, it does not capture the credit quality of these assets. Like our first measure, the bottom-up measure 
is constructed using data reported at the end of 2006 and therefore does not include CDO holdings in 
trading accounts. 
 
2.2. Estimates of holdings of highly-rated tranches. 
Our analysis in this paper focuses on the holdings of highly-rated tranches at the bank level. We 
always normalize the holdings by bank assets. However, before turning to normalized holdings, it is 
useful to briefly discuss the dollar amount of holdings within our sample. Figure 1 shows the evolution of 
total holdings of highly-rated tranches using our primary “highly-rated residual” measure. At the end of 
2006, the last year before the crisis, the banks in our sample held $228 billion of highly-rated tranches. 
The holdings of these tranches increased dramatically since the start of our sample in 2002. In 2002, the 
total holdings of highly-rated tranches were $64 billion. The total holdings keep increasing after the end 
of 2006, experiencing an especially sharp increase in the last quarter of 2007.   
Table 1 shows data on our estimates of holdings of highly-rated tranches by BHCs. We first show 
summary statistics for our primary “highly-rated residual” measure (see Panel A). Although this measure 
is available from 2002 onwards, we specifically focus on 2006. We have data for 231 BHCs. The median 
holdings  of  highly-rated  tranches  (as  a  ratio  of  total  assets)  are  0.15%.  Such  a  holding  is  of  trivial 
importance for a bank. So, for the typical bank, holdings of highly-rated tranches were not a material 15 
 
concern.
10 However, the mean holdings of highly-rated tranches are 1.13%, almost ten times the median. 
Such a result implies that some banks have large holdings of highly-rated tranches compared to the 
typical bank. We show the 90
th percentile of holdings of highly-rated tranches, which is 3.13%.  
In 2006, only 54 of the BHCs in our sample reported trading assets. Of these banks, 14 had trading 
assets in excess of $1 billion and in excess of 10% of the bank’s assets. These “large trading banks” had 
holdings of highly-rated tranches averaging to 4.75%. One way to understand the economic importance of 
such holdings is that the Basel I accord required banks to have capital equal to 8% of  risk-weighted 
assets, half of it in Tier 1 capital. Banks usually hold more regulatory capital than required, but an 80% 
loss on highly-rated tranches would almost wipe out a bank’s Tier 1 required capital for a large trading 
bank. In contrast, the mean of the holdings of highly-rated tranches for the banks that did not report 
trading assets was 0.78%. We also reproduce the holdings of the three largest banks. While these holdings 
are large for Citibank at 4.78%, they are below the mean for both Bank of America (1.04%) and JP 
Morgan Chase (0.63%). 
Panel A also reports information on holdings of highly-rated tranches for other years, from 2002 to 
2008. Neither the mean nor the median changes noticeably during that period of time. The mean increases 
from 1.29% in 2002 to 1.50% in 2005. After 2005, the mean falls, reaching 1.13% in 2008. For the large 
trading  banks,  the  mean  increases  more  noticeably  and  drops  more  sharply  after  peaking  in  2006. 
However, there are only 14 large trading banks in 2006. The number of large trading banks falls to 12 by 
the end of 2007. The large decrease in highly-rated tranches for large trading banks in 2007 is due to the 
merger of the Bank of New York and Mellon. Both banks have high holdings, but the resulting entity is 
not in our sample for 2007 as it is not alive at the end of 2006. If we look instead at the holdings of banks 
alive both at the end of 2006 and of 2007, the mean holdings of highly-rated tranches is 2.94% at the end 
of  2006 and 3.07%  at the  end  of  2007.  The  three largest  banks  have  a different  pattern.  Citibank’s 
holdings more than double over time and reach a peak in 2007. In contrast, neither Bank of America nor 
                                                           
10 Note that the typical bank does not have a trading book. Consequently, for the typical bank, our estimate of 
highly-rated tranches is unbiased. 16 
 
JP Morgan Chase exhibits much of an increase in holdings until 2007 and 2008. The holdings of JP 
Morgan Chase increase from 1.06% in 2006 to 2.55% in 2008. We are unable to ascertain the extent to 
which this increase results from the acquisitions of Bear Stearns and Washington Mutual.   
The next panel of Table 1 uses information on CDO holdings. CDO holdings do not affect the median 
and have a trivial effect on the mean because only six banks report holdings of CDOs in excess of $1 
billion, the reporting threshold. The holdings of highly-rated tranches for the banks with large trading 
books increase only by 0.01%. Panel C adds information on write-downs. Taking into account write-
downs has no impact on most banks. However, the holdings of highly-rated tranches for Citibank increase 
further to 5.68%. The holdings of Bank of America increase to 1.88%. Finally, the holdings of JP Morgan 
Chase remain under 1%.  
The final panel of Table 1 shows our estimates using the bottom-up approach. There is no meaningful 
difference between these estimates and the estimates using our preferred approach for most banks. When 
we turn to the large trading banks, the bottom-up measure has a mean that is higher by 0.29% in 2006. 
The two methods yield different estimates for Citibank and Bank of America. For Citibank, the bottom-up 
method has an estimate that is lower by 0.89%. For Bank of America, the difference of 0.79% is in the 
opposite direction.  
In summary, for most banks, holdings of highly-rated tranches as a proportion of assets were less than 
1% of assets. These holdings were small for some large banks – such as JP Morgan – but the banks with 
large trading assets had on average holdings that were roughly 30 times greater than the holdings relative 
to assets of the typical bank.  The average securities holdings of banks with large trading assets are only 
24% higher than the average securities holdings of the banks without large trading assets. Consequently, 
it is quite clear that banks with large trading assets allocate much more of their securities holdings to 





Section 3. Stock Returns and Highly-Rated Tranches. 
To examine the validity of our measures of highly-rated tranches, we test whether they explain stock 
returns of bank holding companies during the financial crisis.  We calculate each bank’s buy-and-hold 
excess return over the equally-weighted market return for the time period from July 1, 2007 through 
December  31,  2008.  We  then  regress these  buy-and-hold  returns  on the four different  BHC-specific 
measures  of  highly-rated  tranches  holdings  as  of  December  31,  2006.  To  account  for  potential 
nonlinearities in the relation between these holdings and returns, we sort firms into quintiles based on 
their holdings and construct dummy variables for banks in each quintile. The quintile with the lowest 
amount of highly-rated holdings serves as the omitted group.  We expect banks in the highest quintiles of 
highly-rated  tranches  holdings  as  of  December  2006  to  be  associated  with  lower  returns  during  the 
subsequent financial crisis.  
We control for some bank attributes, such as the bank’s market capitalization, prior returns, market-
to-book, and Tier 1 leverage, which are likely to influence stock returns. The size of  a bank’s other 
securities holdings is also expected to affect the returns over the period of the financial crisis. Therefore, 
we  control  for  “other”  securities’  holdings  of  held-to-maturity  and  available-for-sale  securities  and 
“other” trading securities in all regressions.
11 We control for banks’ real estate as well as commercial and 
industrial (C&I) loan exposure in the form of mortgage and C&I loans, scaled by total assets. Banks also 
had unused commitments to make residential and commercial real-estate loans. Following Loutskina and 
Strahan (2011), we control explicitly for such unused loan commitments. 
We present the results in Table 2. Firms in the top quintile of highly-rated tranches holdings are 
associated with about 14% lower returns, on average. For banks in the top quintile, the average of the 
ratio of holdings of highly-rated tranches to equity market capitalization at the end of 2006 is 29.63% (the 
median is 17.02%). The lower returns we document are therefore consistent with the size of the holdings 
and the magnitude of losses on highly-rated tranches that have been documented. The negative coefficient 
                                                           
11 The term “other” securities generally refers to holdings of government, agency, and non-highly-rated private-label 
securities. The appendix contains a precise description of securities included in our measures of “other” H.T.M. and 
A.F.S. securities and “other” Trading securities.   18 
 
on the top quintile is statistically significant for all measures of highly-rated tranches except for the 
bottom-up measure.  The impact of highly-rated tranches holdings on returns is lower for banks that have 
low holdings. Banks in the 2
nd lowest quintile of holdings are associated with an estimate of 5% lower 
returns, which is statistically insignificant. As in Loutskina and Strahan (2011), unused loan commitments 
have a significantly negative impact on returns. As expected, banks with higher exposures to real estate 
through mortgage and C&I loans had significantly negative returns. Other HTM and AFS securities are 
associated  with  larger  returns,  as  are  firms  with  higher  market-to-book  ratios.  Prior  returns,  market 
capitalization, and Tier 1 do not have significant coefficients explaining returns.  Taken together, these 
results provide evidence that our constructed measures of highly-rated tranches holdings predict bank 
stock return performance, which is what one would expect if the poor performance of these highly-rated 
tranches was unexpected.   
 
Section 4. Why Did Banks Hold Highly-Rated Tranches?  
In this section, we test the hypotheses developed in Section 2 using the estimates of highly-rated 
tranches presented in Section 3. We test each hypothesis in turn. We estimate regressions where the 
dependent variable is the fraction of highly-rated tranches held by a bank, normalized by its assets. In all 
regressions,  we  control  for  the  returns  of  the  bank  in  2005-2006,  the  market-to-book  ratio,  Tier  1 
leverage, and the holdings of other securities as of 2006. For the holdings of other securities, we consider 
separately other securities held to maturity and available for sale as well as other trading securities. Since 
these holdings exclude the highly-rated tranches, there is no mechanical relation between these holdings 
and holdings of highly-rated tranches. Panel B of Appendix 1 provides the details of the construction of 
the explanatory variables used in this section.  
We also control for bank asset size.  The impact of BHC asset size on highly-rated tranches is likely 
to be nonlinear. Therefore, we construct a piece-wise linear specification which breaks up the impact of 
asset size into two separate variables. We allow for a possible change in the relation between asset size 
and holdings of highly-rated tranches at $50 billion because banks with assets in excess of $50 billion are 19 
 
more likely to be systemically important.
12 The first variable, named “$0-50 Billion,” captures the impact 
of the first $50 billion worth of assets on holdings of highly-rated tranches.  All BHCs with less than $50 
billion in assets take the value of their asset size while BHCs with assets greater than $50 billion take the 
value of $50 billion. The second variable, which is named “>$50 Billion,” takes a value of 0 for all BHCs 
with less than $50 billion in assets while it takes the actual asset size minus $50 billion for BHCs with 
greater  than  $50  billion  worth  of  assets.  In  this  way,  the  estimated  coefficients  on  the  piece-wise 
specification are additive and hence the sum of the two coefficients estimates the relation between asset 
size and holdings of highly-rated tranches.  
The regressions in Table 3 show estimates of the regressions using these variables only. We see that 
banks’ holdings of highly-rated tranches increase as their size grows, but only up to $50 billion. For banks 
that  have  more  assets  than  $50  billion,  the  fraction  of  assets  held in  highly-rated  tranches  does  not 
increase with size. As discussed in Section 2, such an increase would be expected with the too-big-to-fail 
hypothesis. Consequently, the evidence in Table 3 is inconsistent with the hypothesis that too-big-to-fail 
was a factor influencing holdings of highly-rated tranches (Too-big-to-fail H1).  More formally, we can 
reject the hypothesis that too-big-to-fail banks invested more of their assets in highly-rated tranches at the 
5% level. We therefore conclude that the too-big-to-fail hypothesis is not supported by the data. There is 
also  no  evidence  that  banks  that  held  larger  portfolios  of  trading  securities  other  than  highly-rated 
tranches held more securities in the form of highly-rated tranches. Finally, none of the remaining control 
variables are significant. Importantly, the results are the same irrespective of the estimate of highly-rated 
tranches we use.  
We investigate extensively the robustness of the results in Table 3 concerning the relation between 
highly-rated  tranches  holdings  and  bank  size.  In  particular,  we  use  different  piece-wise  linear 
specifications. With the first one, we allow for different slopes for banks with assets below $50 billion, 
between $50 and $250 billion, and above $250 billion. Again, we find no evidence that the largest banks 
hold more highly-rated tranches. In another specification, we consider separately banks with assets below 
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$100 billion and assets above $100 billion. With this latter specification, the coefficient on the largest 
banks is negative (the coefficient is -0.072) and significant at the 10% level. The largest banks do not hold 
more highly-rated tranches with that specification either.    
 
4.1. Securitization by-product hypothesis.  
As argued by Shleifer and Vishny (2010), in the presence of asymmetric information regarding the 
quality of the loans, banks must retain some portion of the loans securitized.
13 Traditional signaling 
theories further conclude that, in the presence of asymmetric information regarding asset quality, agents 
with an information advantage must retain assets of the lowest quality if the signal is to be viewed as 
credible.  
In a credit-tranched securitization context (non-agency RMBS and CDO’s), such theories predict that 
BHCs  underwriting  securitization  deals  hold  the  equity  tranche  and  lower-rated junior  tranches  as  a 
credible signal of deal quality. Our data does not capture the holdings of equity tranches and other low-
rated tranches. But “skin-in-the-game” as an explanation for the retention of the AAA, AA, and A-rated 
assets  that  we  measure  can  be  motivated  through  a  catering  argument.  That  is,  BHC’s  originate 
securitizations which contain tranches with payoff structures which cater to specific investor preferences. 
For example, junior tranches cater to correlation traders betting on the survival or default of a junior 
tranche  as  a function  of  collateral  correlation (see Nadauld,  Sherlund, and Vorkink  (2011)).   Senior 
tranches cater to institutional investors with a mandate to invest in high credit-quality assets. If BHCs are 
indeed  catering  to  the  high  credit-quality  demands  of  institutional  investors,  signaling  might  still  be 
required. So, BHCs could retain even the highly-rated portions of the resultant securities in order to signal 
the quality of a securitization deal to the institutional investors.        
                                                           
13 The requirement that securitizing banks retain a portion of the securitization is not derived explicitly in Shleifer 
and  Vishny  (2010).  Rather,  they  rely  on  a  prior  literature  in  making  this  assumption.  Prior  literature  proves 
theoretically  the  “skin-in-the-game  result”  in  the  presence  of  asymmetric  information  and  provides  empirical 
evidence in support of the result (see Gorton and Pennacchi (1995), Sufi (2007), and Holmstrom and Tirole (1997)).      21 
 
We test  whether securitization-active  banks  held  more  highly-rated  tranches as  of  December  31, 
2006. We define a BHC as being securitization-active if the outstanding principal balance of assets sold 
and securitized with servicing retained or with recourse or other seller-provided credit enhancements is 
non-zero in any of the years 2003, 2004, 2005, or 2006. According to this definition, 49 BHCs in our 
sample are active in securitization. We estimate highly-rated tranches as a function of the securitization-
active indicator, the piece-wise size variables, and the standard set of controls employed in previous 
tables. Results are presented in Table 4.   
We produce results for the “highly-rated residual” and “highly-rated residual + CDOs” measures of 
highly-rated tranches and report them in columns (1) and (2). We find that securitization active banks 
hold more highly-rated tranches. The coefficient on the indicator variable is 0.015 in both specifications, 
indicating that these banks hold 1.5% more of their assets in the form of highly-rated tranches. Such an 
effect is economically significant since the standard deviation of highly-rated tranches holdings is 3.1%. 
The estimated coefficients on the step-wise size variables are diminished but not wholly subsumed by the 
presence of the securitization-active indicator, suggesting that securitization activity is not a manifestation 
of asset size alone.  Though we do not report the results for the “bottom-up highly-rated tranches” and 
“highly-rated residual + CDOs and Writedowns” measures, the regression estimates are very similar to 
those reported in columns (1) and (2). In regressions (3) and (4), we use the change in the securitization 
activity of a bank four quarters apart. We see that holdings of highly-rated tranches increase with the 
change in securitization activity. We interpret the results as being consistent with a “skin-in-the-game” 
hypothesis. However, it is important to stress a limitation of our data. We cannot tell whether a bank 
holds highly-rated tranches from its own securitizations or from securitizations produced by other banks. 
The “skin-in-the-game” hypothesis would suggest that the bank retains its own securitizations. Yet, there 
could be signaling value to a firm from holding securitization tranches even if they are not its own if the 
intent is to demonstrate the value of securitization tranches.  
The measure of securitization we use is a measure based on a bank’s own securitization activities. 
Alternatively, we could use a measure of participation of banks in the underwriting of securitizations. To 22 
 
do so, we create an indicator variable for any BHC, which shows up in the League Tables of RMBS, 
CLO, CBO, or CDO securitization activity (“Securitization-league-table Indicator”).
14 Out of 231 banks 
in our December-2006 sample, 12 banks meet the criterion. We show the regression estimates with this 
measure in columns (5) and (6) of Table 4. We find that these estimates are positive but not significant.  
We saw in Figure 1 that the aggregate dollar amount of highly-rated tranches holdings increased 
through time. The increase is supportive of the role of securitization as a determinant of holdings of 
highly-rated tranches. To check this hypothesis further, regressions (5) and (6) of Table 4 use an estimate 
of  a  bank’s  loan  pipeline.  Our  “loan  pipeline”  measure  calculates  the  average  amount  of  retail  and 
wholesale closed-end first and junior lien loans made on 1-4 family residential properties that were for 
sale during the year 2006, scaled by total assets. In regressions utilizing the loan-pipeline measure, we 
estimate our dependent variable, highly-rated tranches, as of 2007. This measure is not significant in 
explaining banks’ holdings of highly-rated tranches.  
Figure 1 shows that the aggregate dollar of highly-rated tranches experienced an especially sharp 
increase from the last quarter of 2006 to the last quarter of 2007. This increase is supportive of the 
hypothesis that banks accumulated highly-rated tranches rapidly as the market turned because they had 
trouble  selling  these  tranches.  However,  even  though  the  aggregate  amount  of  highly-rated  tranches 
increased the most from 2006 to 2007, total assets increased as well, so that the large dollar increase is not 
accompanied by a noticeable increase in percentage holdings. Consequently, the evidence on percentage 
holdings  does  not support  the  view that  banks  accumulated  holdings  at  a  rapid  pace  in  2007. Their 
behavior is consistent with having kept their allocation to highly-rated tranches roughly constant.  
Next we explore whether highly-rated tranches increased over time as a result of the increase in 
securitization activities further. For that purpose, we run regressions of the year-over-year change in 
holdings of these tranches on the year-over-year changes in the outstanding principal balance of assets 
sold or securitized (with servicing retained or with recourse).  We use quarterly data from the first quarter 
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of 2002 to the last quarter of 2006 and normalize the change in the highly-rated holdings or outstanding 
balance of securitizations from t-4 to t using assets as of t-4. Results are reported in column (7) of Table 
4.  The  coefficient  on  the  ratio  of  the  change  in  securitization  over  lagged  assets  is  a  positive  and 
significant at the 10% level. In the last column of table 4, we focus on outstanding principal balance of 
only mortgages sold or securitized and find similar results. 
Finally,  the  increase  in  holdings  of  highly-rated  tranches  should  be  concentrated  among 
securitization-active  banks.  In  Figure  2,  we  plot  the  holdings  of  highly-rated  tranches  through  time 
separately  for  securitization-active  banks  and  non-securitization  active  banks.  In  2006,  securitization 
active banks had highly-rated tranches holdings of 3.1% in comparison to holdings of 0.8% for other 
banks. For the securitization-active banks, holdings of highly-rated tranches increased from 2.1% of total 
assets in Q1 2002 to 3.3% in Q1 2007, while highly-rated holdings for the non-active banks remained 
virtually unchanged over the same period.  A formal test of the 1.2% difference in highly-rated holdings 
between Q1 2002 and Q1 2007 for securitization-active banks yields a t-statistic of 1.30.  
Our analysis is strongly supportive of the hypothesis that banks engaged in securitization held more 
highly-rated  tranches  (Securitization  H1)  and  the  hypothesis  that  holdings  of  highly-rated  tranches 
increased  over  time  (Securitization  H2).  We  also  find  weak  evidence  that  holdings  of  highly-rated 
tranches for firms active in securitization increased more in 2007 (Securitization H3).  
 
4.2. Regulatory arbitrage.  
Acharya and Richardson (2009) argue that BHCs find it advantageous to hold highly-rated assets as a 
form  of  regulatory  capital  arbitrage.  Regulatory  arbitrage  occurs  because  banks  have  to  hold  less 
regulatory capital if, for example, mortgage loans on the balance sheet are transformed into AAA-rated 
bonds via securitization. Transforming mortgages into highly-rated securities can also result in a cheaper 
source of funding for BHCs through asset-backed commercial (ABCP) programs,  where commercial 
paper is issued at a lower cost since it is collateralized by highly-rated securities (see Acharya, Schnabl, 
and  Suarez  (2010)).  Finally,  Acharya,  Schnabl,  and  Suarez  (2010)  show  that  structured  investment 24 
 
vehicles (SIVs) were a form of regulatory arbitrage that enabled banks to hold various assets, including 
highly-rated tranches, with almost no regulatory capital. To implement this regulatory arbitrage, banks did 
not have to hold highly-rated tranches on their balance sheet. Consequently, our approach has nothing to 
say about regulatory arbitrage that involves holdings of highly-rated tranches in bank off-balance sheet 
vehicles. It might be, however, that banks that engaged in regulatory arbitrage through SIVs held more 
highly-rated tranches as an inventory available for their SIVs. Too few banks in our sample sponsored 
SIVs for us to test that hypothesis reliably.
15 
To test the regulatory-arbitrage hypothesis, we examine whether BHCs’ issuance or sponsoring of 
asset-backed  commercial  paper  can  explain  their  holdings  of  highly-rated  tranches.  We  construct  an 
indicator variable for all BHCs active in the ABCP market, either through direct issuance or through 
sponsoring credit enhancements in the ABCP issuance. We estimate regressions that explain holdings of 
highly-rated tranches as a function of this indicator variable (“ABCP Activity Indicator”), the piece-wise 
asset size variables, and a set of other controls.  In this test, we estimate highly-rated holdings as of 
December 2007 and explain holdings using a 2006 ABCP indicator variable., which is equal to one if the 
BHC engaged in any ABCP activity in years 2003-2006.   
The results presented in the first two regressions of Table 5 provide little support for the regulatory-
arbitrage  hypothesis  through  ABCP  issuance.  The  coefficients  on  the  ABCP  indicator  variable  are 
negative,  though  they  lack  statistical  significance,  and  are  of  little  magnitude  economically.  The 
remaining control variables are mostly consistent with results in previous tables. Estimates on the impact 
of the first $50 billion of asset size remain quantitatively similar to previous tables but are not significant 
in the ABCP specification.  This evidence is therefore not supportive of the theory that banks held highly-
rated tranches as a form of regulatory arbitrage.      
                                                           
15 Only 12 bank holding companies in our sample sponsored off-balance sheet conduits in general, and only one, 
Citigroup, was affiliated with SIV’s as a specific type of conduit. The 12 banks that sponsored off-balance sheet 
conduits  are  also  the  banks  with  ABCP  programs,  so  that  we  cannot  distinguish  between  banks  with  ABCP 
programs and banks with conduits. 25 
 
We develop an alternative measure of a BHC’s propensity to engage in regulatory arbitrage that does 
not rely on ABCP activity.  In March 2001, the Federal Reserve allowed BHCs to incorporate credit 
ratings in calculating regulatory capital for holdings of securities. Prior to the rule change, capital charges 
on  securities  were  dictated  by  asset  type  rather  than  credit  quality.    For  example,  mortgage-backed 
securities issued or guaranteed by Fannie Mae carried a 20% risk-weighting (so that the capital set aside 
was 20% of 8%, or 1.6%, in comparison with 8% for corporate loans) capital charge, but non-agency 
mortgage-backed  securities  that  were  viewed  as  having  similar  risk  carried  a  greater  capital  charge. 
Following the rule change, the regulatory capital charge became a function of the securities’ credit rating 
rather than asset class. AAA-rated and AA-rated securitizations became associated with a 20% risk-
weighting,  A-rated  securitizations  a  50%  risk-weighting,  BBB-rated  securitizations  a  100%  risk-
weighting, and BB-rated securitizations a 150% risk-weighting. Thus, following the rule change, poor 
credit-quality securitized assets became more expensive from a regulatory standpoint.            
The rule change provides an opportunity to identify BHCs with a propensity to engage in regulatory 
arbitrage. We consider whether a BHC’s use of regulatory-capital arbitrage opportunities arising from the 
ratings-based  capital  change  has  any  power  in  predicting  its  holdings  of  highly-rated  tranches  in 
subsequent years.  To do so, we calculate the change in leverage for each BHC in our sample from the 
fourth quarter of 2000 to the fourth quarter of 2002 and hypothesize that BHCs with the largest change in 
leverage  surrounding  the  event  are  those  with  a  higher  propensity  to  engage  in  regulatory  capital 
arbitrage.   
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 5 regress the holdings of highly-rated tranches in December 2006 as a 
function of the change in leverage from 2000 Q4 to 2002 Q4. If banks that took advantage of the change 
to increase their leverage are those that engage in regulatory arbitrage, we should see a positive relation 
between holdings of highly-rated tranches and the change in leverage around the regulatory change. The 
change-in-leverage variable is positively related to holdings of highly-rated tranches, but the coefficient is 
not statistically significant.   26 
 
There has been much discussion that the market risk amendment to the Basel accord allows banks to 
hold highly-rated tranches in their trading book with very little regulatory capital compared to banks that 
can only hold the tranches in their banking book. However, as discussed earlier, banks with a trading 
book could hold more highly-rated tranches to have an inventory for market-making purposes. The final 
two regressions of Table 5 use an indicator variable (“Market Risk Equivalent Bank Indicator”) for banks 
that had the right to use their own value-at-risk model to satisfy capital requirements on their trading 
book.
16 We find no evidence that these banks held more highly-rated tranches. We estimate (but do not 
tabulate) the same regression without the size variables. Without the size variables, the indicator variable 
is  significant.  However,  the  R-squared  of  the  regression  drops  by  half.  The  significance  of  the  size 
variables is not affected by the presence of the market risk indicator and the inclusion of the market risk 
indicator has only a trivial impact on the R-squared.        
With the regulatory arbitrage hypothesis, we would expect banks with higher leverage to have larger 
holdings of highly-rated tranches as such banks would be expected to take more advantage of investments 
that economize regulatory capital. However, as seen in Tables 4 and 5, Tier I leverage does not have a 
significant coefficient, which implies that banks that are more constrained in regulatory capital do not 
seem to be holding more highly-rated tranches (Regulatory Arbitrage H1). Overall, there is no evidence 
for the hypothesis that banks that engage in more regulatory arbitrage activities have larger holdings of 
highly-rated tranches  (Regulatory  Arbitrage  H2).  Again, it is  important to  mention  that our study  is 
focused on explaining holdings of highly-rated tranches on banks’ balance sheets. Hence, our analysis 
does not address off-balance sheet regulatory arbitrage.  
Finally, we consider the possibility of BHCs having engaged in regulatory arbitrage through the 
securitization channel itself.  From a regulatory capital standpoint, it is cheaper for banks to hold a 
portfolio of mortgages in the form of highly-rated securitizations than to hold an unsecuritized portfolio 
                                                           
16 A BHC is subject to the market risk capital guidelines, and thus able to use its own estimates of value-at- risk in 
calculating  capital  requirements,  if  it’s  consolidated  trading  activity,  defined  as  the  sum  of  trading  assets  and 
liabilities for the previous quarter, equals: (1) 10% or more of the BHCs total assets for the previous quarter, or (2) 
$1 billion or more.   The Federal Reserve may include or exempt a BHC where it feels appropriate. Our Dec. 2006 
sample of 231 BHCs includes 14 BHCs that meet the market risk capital guidelines.  27 
 
of mortgages. This is because AAA-rated securitizations, for example, carry a 20% risk-weighting while 
unsecuritized subprime mortgages carry a much larger risk weight.  As such, it could be that securitization 
activity is an efficient mechanism to transform an expensive portfolio, from a regulatory standpoint, into a 
cheaper portfolio.   
We provide two pieces of evidence that indicate that banks engaged in securitization did not engage 
in regulatory arbitrage on their balance sheet (as opposed to the off-balance sheet ABCP mechanism 
documented by Acharya, Schnabl, and Suarez (2010)) so that they could hold less regulatory capital than 
other  banks.  First,  we  examine  whether  levels  of  regulatory  capital  were  overly  aggressive  among 
securitization-active banks. For each BHC, we calculate the regulatory “cushion,” which is the ratio of 
tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets, minus the tier 1 requirement of 4%. We plot the results in Figure 2. 
While securitization-active BHCs do, on average, exhibit a lower regulatory capital cushion, the cushion 
is not close to the regulatory boundary, nor does it change through time as would be expected of a BHC 
wanting to push the boundaries of regulatory capital through increased securitization activity.   
A second piece of evidence comes from examining the ratio of total assets to risk-weighted assets. In 
order to control for bank size, we create a size-based matched sample of securitization-active and non-
securitization  active  banks  and  plot  the  ratio  of  total  assets  to  risk-weighted  assets  in  Figure  3.  A 
securitization-driven regulatory arbitrage hypothesis predicts that securitization-active banks would amass 
more total assets for a given level of risk-weighted assets than non-securitization active banks.  Figure 3 
demonstrates that the data do not support this view. Rather, securitization active banks have a lower ratio 
of total assets to risk-weighted assets than their counterparts of roughly equal size. Taken together, we 
interpret the results as being consistent with the view that regulatory capital arbitrage was not the primary 
driver of securitization activity.    
 
4.3. Bad incentives.  
There are two distinct “bad incentives” hypotheses. The poor-incentives hypothesis argues that banks 
had compensation plans that made it advantageous for managers and traders to play the carry trade, 28 
 
holding positions in highly-rated tranches while borrowing at the firm’s cost of funds. Consequently, the 
incentives can be bad at lower levels of a bank – say at the trader level.  It is also possible for incentives 
to be poor at the top. We examine both possibilities. 
We  would  expect  that  poor  incentives  are  more  likely  to  exist  in  banks  with  poor  governance. 
Consequently, banks with poor governance would be more likely to be banks with greater holdings of 
highly-rated tranches. To test this hypothesis, the first regression of Table 6 uses a “Governance Index” 
that contains 41 firm-level attributes from RiskMetrics and that increases with the protection of minority 
shareholders (see Aggarwal, Erel, Ferreira, and Matos (2011) for a detailed explanation of the index). We 
find no relation between holdings of highly-rated tranches and a bank’s governance index.  
The data on compensation contracts below the top five officers of banks is not available. However, it 
is often argued that there is an incentive problem with traders’ compensation, since generally they receive 
a share of the profits they generate but do not have to pay for losses they generate. Consequently, if the 
hypothesis is correct, we would expect the problems to arise in banks that have trading operations. Table 
5 shows, however, that there is no evidence that banks with larger trading portfolios have more highly-
rated tranches.
17 In unreported results, we also re-estimated the regressions of Table 5 with an indicator 
variable for any bank with non-zero trading assets and still find that the trading asset indicator variable is 
not significant.  
We construct several measures of CEO compensation and test whether these measures can explain 
differences in holdings of highly-rated tranches (see Panel B of Appendix 1 for a detailed description of 
the managerial-compensation measures). Our first measure calculates the elasticity of total managerial 
compensation to a BHC’s return on equity (ROE), where the ROE is calculated as net income divided by 
total common equity as of fiscal year end.
18  ROE is a performance measure that is not risk adjusted and 
does not account for the cost of equity. Therefore, a bank’s ROE can be increased through carry-trade 
                                                           
17 Columns (3) and (4) in Table 5 estimate the relationship between holdings of highly-rated tranches and BHCs 
with large trading portfolios.   
18 The numerator of the compensation-ROE elasticity is calculated as the change in compensation from 2001-2005 
divided by 2001 levels of compensation. The denominator is calculated as the change in ROE from 2001-2005 
divided by 2001. ROE Details are provided in the data appendix.   29 
 
positions and through increases in leverage. This elasticity measure is designed to capture the relationship 
between total managerial compensation and firm performance. To the extent that highly-rated tranches 
bolster non-risk-adjusted firm performance because they have a higher yield than other similarly rated 
securities, managers with a higher elasticity of compensation to non-risk-adjusted performance would 
find it advantageous to hold more highly-rated tranches relative to managers whose compensation is less 
sensitive to non-risk-adjusted performance. 
The  second  regression  of  Table  6  reports  estimates  of  a  regression  of  holdings  of  highly-rated 
tranches on measures of the elasticity of managerial compensation to performance. The elasticity variable 
named “High-Compensation Elasticity” is equal to one for firms with above-median elasticity of the 
CEOs total compensation to changes in bank ROE. The sample is limited to 51 BHCs on account of 
limited availability of the compensation data. The relationship between holdings of highly-rated tranches 
and compensation elasticity is positive, as expected, but the estimates lack statistical significance. Lack of 
significance may be due to the limited sample size, given that the coefficient on the $50-billion size 
variable, which was significant in previous estimates, also lacks significance in this small sample.       
We also consider alternative measures of managerial compensation. Column (3) in Table 6 regresses 
holdings  of  highly-rated  tranches  on  managers’  “Compensation  Residual”  (see  Cheng,  Hong,  and 
Sheinkmann (2010)) and control variables. Compensation residual, a measure of excess compensation, is 
constructed by computing the natural logarithm (log) of average total compensation from 2003 to 2005. 
This log average compensation is then regressed on the log of the firm’s 2005 market cap. The residual 
from  this  regression,  estimated  in  2005,  serves  as  the  compensation  residual  variable  in  our  cross-
sectional regressions of highly-rated holdings in 2006.  The coefficient on the residual is positive but 
insignificant. With residual compensation data on only 67 CEOs, the limited sample size may continue to 
limit the power of the tests.
19 
                                                           
19 Although we have compensation data on as many as 89 CEOs as of 2006, the compensation residual regressions 
require data on compensation from 2003-2005, which limits our sample to 67.  30 
 
Finally, regression (4) in Table 6 uses another measure of managerial compensation, the bonus-to-
salary ratio. This “Bonus-per-Salary” variable is calculated as the ratio of the CEO’s total bonus to his 
base salary. It affords the largest sample size of any of the compensation regressions, though the sample is 
still  limited  to  89  observations.  The  results  presented  in  Table  6  indicate  virtually  no  statistical 
relationship exists between “bonus-per-salary” and holdings of highly-rated tranches. The standard set of 
control variables exhibits their usual signs, magnitudes, and significance in all specifications.  
There has been much criticism of the impact of options on risk-taking incentives (see, for instance, 
Bebchuck and Spamman (2010)). We test whether banks where the CEO’s compensation exhibited more 
option-like features (more sensitivity to volatility) held more highly-rated tranches. The coefficient on 
“Equity Risk” is negative with a t-statistic of -1.34. There is therefore no evidence supporting the view 
that option-like compensation led to more risk taking through holdings of highly-rated tranches. 
In  summary,  we  find  no  support  for  the  hypothesis  advanced  by  various  observers  that  “bad 
incentives” explain holdings of more highly-rated tranches.  
 
4.4. Good deals.  
The last two regressions of Table 6 investigate the relation between holdings of highly-rated tranches 
and  equity  incentives  of  CEOs.  The  coefficients  on  our  estimates  of  equity  incentives  of  CEOs  are 
insignificant. In other words, the banks of CEOs with more incentives to maximize shareholder wealth 
did not hold more or fewer highly-rated tranches than other banks. Such a result would be consistent with 
the model of Gennaioli, Shleifer and Vishny (2011) where investors in general ignore some possible 
adverse outcomes in making their investment decisions. Such failure to account for some possible adverse 
outcomes in their model is pervasive and hence does not directly offer a prediction on which banks held 
more  highly-rated  tranches  for  investment  purposes.  Their  model  does  predict  greater  holdings  of 




Section 5. Investment banks. 
As discussed in the introduction, stand-alone investment banks did not have to report the information 
that we use in this paper to estimate holdings of highly-rated tranches by banks. Investment banks did 
report information about exposures to securitizations and to subprime mortgages. However, the reporting 
format was specific to each bank. We collected information for 2006. Some of that information was only 
made  available in  filings  for  the  2007  reporting  year.  A  brief  summary  of  available  information  on 
holdings of highly-rated tranches is as follows: 
1)  Bear Stearns. Bear Stearns reports data on retained interests in its own securitizations. It states 
that “Retained interests in securitizations are generally not held to maturity and typically are sold 
shortly  after  the  settlement  of  a  securitization.”  (2007  10-K).  On  November  30,  2006,  Bear 
Stearns  had  AAA-rated  retained  interests  in  non-agency  securitizations  of  $1.5  billion.  In 
addition, it had $2.6 billion on non-AAA rated non-agency retained interests. The 10-K also 
reported AAA-rated CDO exposure as $755 million. Separately, it reported subprime mortgage 
exposure for November 30, 2007. It had $1 billion of subprime investment-grade securitizations. 
But, Bear Stearns' overall subprime exposure was negative $582 million because it had a short 
position in ABS CDSs. Finally, it reported securitizations that did not qualify for sale treatment 
and hence were on its balance sheet. The total for mortgage securitizations and CDOs  as of 
November 30, 2006 was $30 billion, but its exposure to loss was $800 million.  
2)  Goldman Sachs. In the 2007 10-K, the bank said that the fair value of retained interests from 
mortgage-backed securities, as of 2006, was $4 billion. It had another $2 billion of retained 
interests in CDOs and CLOs. In addition, the firm had purchased interests in residential mortgage 
securitizations of $8 billion “purchased in connection with secondary market-making activities.” 
It also had holdings that were not consolidated in the balance sheet for mortgage CDOs of $26 
billion and of corporate CDOs and CLOs of $11 billion. However, the purchased and retained 
interests  associated  with  these  securitizations  were  only  $2  billion.  Further,  it  had  exposure 
through derivatives on these securitizations of $10 billion. The bank also reported its subprime 32 
 
exposure for November 2007, which was $2 billion. Its Alt-A exposure was around $6 billion. 
Furthermore, the bank reported amounts held in securities that may be more difficult to fund on a 
secured basis in times of stress in its 2007 10-K. For example, it held $41 billion of mortgage and 
other asset-backed loans and securities as of November 2006. As of November 2007, it reported 
level 3 “loans and securities backed by residential estate” for $2 billion.  
3)  Lehman Brothers. In its 2007 10-K, Lehman provided an estimate of its holdings of mortgage and 
asset-backed securities as of November 30, 2006. The total amount, which included whole loans 
and servicing, was $52 billion. Securities amounted to $10 billion. Investment-grade retained 
interests in securitizations were $5.3 billion for residential and asset backed while they were for 
$0.6 billion for commercial mortgage loans and CMBSs. Using data on agency securitizations, it 
follows  that  holdings  of  private-label  investment-grade  securitizations  were  $3.4  billion.  A 
separate table provides exposure to subprime mortgages. The total was $6.9 billion, of which $1.8 
billion corresponds to retained interests in securitizations. In its fair value table for 2007, Lehman 
reports holdings of $89 billion of mortgage and asset-backed securities. These holdings include 
holdings of agency mortgage-backed securities. 
4)  Merrill Lynch. It reported total U.S. subprime exposures of $2.7 billion at the end of 2007, but it 
also  made  losses  in  2007  of  $3.1  billion  on  subprime  exposures.  In  addition,  it  had  Alt-A 
exposures of $2.7 billion. The bank had retained interests on residential mortgage loans of $2.8 
billion at the end of 2007. Its exposure to securitizations that were consolidated on its balance 
sheet for real estate was $4.3 billion in 2006 and $16.3 billion in 2007, but investors had no 
recourse to Merrill. It reports a long exposure in super-senior CDOs of $30.4 billion and a short 
exposure of $23.6 billion as of 2007. However, in addition, it made losses of $14.6 billion on 
CDOs in 2007, so that an estimate of its end of 2006 exposure is $21 billion.  
5)  Morgan  Stanley.  It  showed  retained  interests  from  private  label  residential  mortgage 
securitizations of $3.2 billion at the end of November 2007. Of these, $1.2 billion were non-
investment grade. Securitizations that were consolidated in the balance sheet are for $5.9 billion, 33 
 
with an exposure of $1.75 billion. In a conference presentation, Morgan Stanley showed  net 
subprime exposure of $10.4 billion at the end of the third quarter of 2007, most of which was 
written down the next quarter. Further, it had $14 billion of other mortgage net exposure and $36 
billion of net CMBS exposure. Based on one of the tables in 2007 10-K, the bank’s net subprime 
exposure was $6.1 billion as of November 30, 2007. It had a long exposure of $11.1 subprime 
exposure in loans, total return swaps, and CDS, but most of that exposure was from $7.8 billion 
in ABS CDS. It reported CDO subprime exposure of negative $5 billion. Its holdings of CDOs 
amounted to $1 billion, but it had a net short derivatives position of $6 billion. In another table, 
however, it reports that the net total U.S. subprime trading exposure was $1.8 billion. 
 
Three of the investment banks, Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch, and Morgan Stanley, had assets in 
excess of $1 trillion at the end of 2007. The assets of Bear Stearns were $395 billion and those of Lehman 
Brothers were $691 billion. Our estimates of the non-agency securitization exposures of the investment 
banks are not equivalent to those of the bank holding companies. Nevertheless, three facts are worth 
noting.  First,  the  net  exposures  to  securitizations  are  not  higher  than  the  holdings  of  bank  holding 
companies with large trading assets. Second, the investment banks focus much more on net exposures, so 
that long holdings are likely to be substantially larger than the long holdings of bank holding companies. 
Third, derivatives play a large role in the exposures of investment banks.   
   
Section 6. Conclusion. 
In this paper, we estimate holdings of highly-rated tranches of American banks. We use four different 
approaches to estimate these holdings and the different approaches lead to similar conclusions. Using a 
sample  of  231  publicly-traded  U.S.  bank  holding  companies,  we  find  that  holdings  of  highly-rated 
tranches  were  economically  trivial  for  the  typical  bank  before  the  credit  crisis.  The  average  of  the 
holdings across the banking sector was only 1.3% of assets, but the average of the holdings for the banks 
with large trading positions was almost 5%. Yet, even among these banks, there was wide dispersion in 34 
 
holdings. For instance, our estimate of holdings for JP Morgan Chase is less than 1% of assets, but 
Citigroup had holdings in excess of 5%. Though the data we use for bank holding companies is not 
available  for  investment  banks,  we  show  that  investment  banks  did  not  have  net  exposures  to 
securitizations that were systematically greater than the holdings we measure for bank holding companies.  
We investigate many of the hypotheses that have been advanced to explain holdings of highly-rated 
tranches by banks. The large dispersion of holdings across the largest banks explains why there is no 
support  for  the  arguments  that  banks  that  are  viewed  as  too-big-to-fail  had  incentives  to  have  large 
holdings of such assets. In regressions, we find that bank holdings of highly-rated tranches increase with 
their asset size, but only up to $50 billion. For banks that have more than $50 billion in assets, those 
deemed “too-big-to-fail,” their holdings of highly-rated tranches do not significantly increase with asset 
size. The securitization by-product hypothesis argues that holding tranches of originated securitization 
deals serves as a credible signal of deal quality to potential investors. As such, we would expect banks 
that are active in securitization to hold a larger amount of highly-rated tranches as a fraction of their 
assets.  Consistent with this hypothesis, we find that banks that were active in securitization between 2003 
and 2006, either through origination or in the providing of credit enhancements, held 1.5% larger amounts 
of highly-rated tranches as a fraction of total assets as of December 31, 2006 than the other banks.  
We find no evidence in support of regulatory capital arbitrage hypotheses. In particular, there is no 
evidence that banks with ABCP programs held more highly-rated tranches. If banks that engage the most 
in regulatory arbitrage are banks that have less slack in terms of regulatory capital than other banks, we 
show that banks that engaged in securitization do not meet that criterion. It is often argued that banks used 
the more advantageous capital requirements of the trading book for the purpose of regulatory arbitrage. 
However,  controlling  for  size,  we  do  not  find  that  these  banks  held  more  highly-rated  tranches  of 
securitizations. An important caveat is that in our assessment of regulatory arbitrage we focus on the 
assets held by banks on their balance sheets. Acharya, Schnabl, and Suarez (2010) show that off-balance 
sheet vehicles enabled banks to engage in regulatory arbitrage. While these vehicles were important for 35 
 
some banks, the fact that only one bank in our sample sponsored SIVs makes it impossible for us to 
reliably determine the relation between SIV holdings and holdings of highly-rated tranches.   
Lastly, we explore “bad incentives” explanations for holdings of highly-rated tranches. We find that 
holdings of highly-rated tranches are unrelated to an index of governance quality of banks. Further, there 
is no evidence that banks where compensation was more focused on ROE, where bonuses were high 
relative to salary, where option compensation was more important, and where unexplained compensation 
was high held more highly- rated tranches. Finally, CEO equity incentives do not appear to be related to 
holdings of highly-rated tranches. Consequently, it is not the case that banks where CEOs had greater 
incentives to maximize shareholder wealth differed in their holdings of highly-rated tranches.  
Banks are highly levered. Because of their high leverage, banks become distressed if they make large 
losses on any material asset class that they invest in. With a large adverse shock to the economy, it is 
ineluctable that banks will make large losses on some asset classes. Our evidence shows that the evidence 
is fully consistent with the view that banks that invested more in highly-rated tranches did so as a normal 
outcome of being active in the securitization business.  
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Appendix 1 – Panel A: Dependent Variables 
Our main data source is the Consolidated Financial Statements for Bank Holding Companies, the form FR Y-9C. We focus on Schedules HC-B 
(Securities), HC-D (Trading Assets), and HC-R (Regulatory Capital) to construct our main variables of interest. Below we list their definitions 
with references to schedules and data mnemonics in the form FR Y-9C. 
Variable Name  Schedule  Data Mnemonic 
Highly-Rated Residual: Summation of non-government or non-
agency mortgage-backed securities (MBSs) as well as asset-backed 
securities (ABSs) that are rated in the highest three investment-
grade (e.g., AAA, AA, or A) categories and non-government, non-
agency MBSs in trading securities. The measure includes held-to-
maturity (HTM) and available-for-sale (AFS) securities with 20% 
or 50% risk weight minus securities in 20% or 50% risk-weight 
category that are issued or guaranteed by the government or 
government-sponsored agencies. All values are at amortized costs, 
except for MBSs from trading assets that are recorded at fair values. 
 
Schedules from Form FR Y-9C as of 
December 2006: HC-R Item 35 (Column 
D) + Item 35 (Column E) + Item 36 
(Column D) + Item 36 (Column E) - HC-
B Item 2b (Columns A+C) – Item 4a2 
(Columns A+C) – Item 4b1 (Columns 
A+C) – Item 4b2 (Columns A+C) - Item 3 










Highly-Rated Residual + CDOs: Summation of the “Highly-Rated 




+ Schedule HC-D (from Form FR Y-9C 
as of June 2008) Item 5a+ Item 5b 
Highly-Rated Residual 
+ bhckf649 + bhckf650 
Highly-Rated Residual + CDOs and Writedowns: Summation of 
“Highly-Rated Residual + CDOs” and the writedowns on CDOs 
between December 2006 and June 2008. 
 
Highly-Rated Residual + CDOs 
+CDO Writedowns from Bloomberg 
Highly-Rated Residual  + 
CDOs + CDO Writedowns 
from Bloomberg 
Bottom-up Highly-Rated Tranches: Total value of MBSs that are 
not issued or guaranteed by the government or government-
sponsored agencies plus ABSs, using HTM securities at amortized 
costs and AFS and trading securities at fair values. Note that there 
is no ABS data for trading securities so ABS part includes only 
HTM and AFS securities. 
Schedules from Form FR Y-9C as of 
December 2006: HC-B Items 4a3 
(Columns A+D) + 4b3 (Columns A+D) + 






Appendix 1 – Panel B: Independent Variables 
Variable Name  Data Source and Algebraic Expression 
or Data Mnemonic 
$0-50 Billion and > $50 Billion: We construct a piece-wise linear specification which breaks up the 
impact of asset size into two separate variables. The “$0-50 Billion” variable captures the impact of 
the first $50 Billion worth of assets on holdings of highly-rated tranches. In constructing this variable, 
each BHC in our sample takes the value Min{BHC asset size, $50 Billion}.  The “>$50 Billion” 
variable captures the impact on highly-rated holdings of assets in excess of $50 Billion. In 






ABCP Activity Indicator: It is an indicator variable that is equal to one if a bank has any Asset 
Backed Commercial Paper (ABCP) activity during the years 2003-2006. A bank is ABCP active if the 
maximum amount of its credit exposure arising from credit enhancements provided to asset-backed 
commercial paper conduit structures in the form of standby letters of credit, subordinated securities 
and other credit enhancements is not zero. Note that we also include the amount of unused 
commitments to provide liquidity to conduit structures.  
 
Schedule HC-S: 
Variable equal to 1 if bhck806  +  




Bonus-per-Salary: This variable is calculated as the ratio of total managerial bonuses divided by total 
managerial salary. 
 








CEO Ownership %: This variable is calculated as total CEO ownership divided by total shares 
outstanding as of year-end 2006. Total ownership is calculated as the sum of delta weighted options 
and shares owned (both unrestricted and unvested restricted stock).   
 
 
Execucomp and Compustat 
Change in Leverage, 2000 Q4 – 2002 Q4: This variable is calculated as the change in Tier 1 leverage 
from 2000 Q4 to 2002 Q4.  In March 2001 banks began incorporating a loan’s credit rating into 
calculations of risk-based capital. Prior to the rule change, risk-based capital was calculated based on 
asset type rather than explicit asset risk, as measured by credit ratings. Firms experiencing the largest 
increase in leverage surrounding the ratings-based rule change are identified as firms likely to have 
been engaging in regulatory capital arbitrage.  
 






Compensation Residual: This variable is constructed by computing the log of average total executive 
compensation from 2003-2005, which is regressed on the log of firms’ 2005 market cap. The residual 
from this regression, estimated in 2005, serves as the compensation residual variable in the cross-
sectional regressions estimated in 2006.     
 
Execucomp and Compustat 
 
Dollar Gain from +1%: This variable calculates the change in CEO wealth per 1% increase in 
shareholder wealth. It is calculated as market cap * .01 * delta-weighted ownership. 
 
Execucomp and Compustat 
 
Equity Risk (%): This variable represents the percent change in CEO wealth that results given a 
change in volatility of 1%. The variable is created by calculating the change in option value given a 
1% change in volatility. The change in option value for a given change in volatility is then divided by 
the sum of the value of the delta-weighted option portfolio, stock holdings, and preferred share 
holdings of the CEO. 
 




Governance Index: Index of 41 firm-level attributes from RiskMetrics. The index increases with the 
protection of minority shareholders and incorporates measures of board structure, anti-takeover 
provisions, auditor selection as well as compensation and ownership structure. 
 
RiskMetrics: 
Governance index from Aggarwal, Erel, 
Ferreira, and Matos (2011) 
High-Compensation Elasticity:  This variable measures the elasticity of the CEO’s total 
compensation to changes in bank ROE Total compensation comprised of the following: Salary, Bonus, 
Other Annual, Total Value of Restricted Stock Granted, Total Value of Stock Options Granted (using 
Black-Scholes), Long-Term Incentive Payouts, and All Other Total. Return on Equity is calculated as: 
Net Income / Common Equity Total as of Fiscal Year End. Bonus elasticity is computed using only 
the total dollar amount of bonuses paid to the CEO. In our regression framework, we create an 
indicator variable equal to one for BHCs with above-median levels of comp/ROE elasticity.  
 
Execucomp and Compustat 
Loan Pipeline: This variable calculates the total amount of retail and wholesale closed-end first and 
junior lien loans made on 1-4 family residential properties that were for sale during 2006. The total 
dollar amount of loans for sale is scaled by total assets. 
 
Schedule HC-P: 
(bhckf066 + bhckf067 + bhckf068 + 
bhckf069)/bhck2170 
Log Market Cap: Log of December 2006 market capitalization. 
 
CRSP: 
Market price * shares outstanding  
Log Market-to-Book: Log of the ratio of December 2006 market capitalization to 2006 fiscal year-
end book value of equity.   
 
CRSP and Compustat: 
(Market price*shares outstanding)/book 
value of equity, fiscal year end. 41 
 
 
Market Risk Equivalent Bank Indicator: This variable is equal to one for any BHC that is subject to 
the market risk capital guidelines. A BHC is subject to the market risk capital guidelines, and thus able 
to use estimates of V.A.R. in calculating capital requirements, if it’s consolidated trading activity, 
defined as the sum of trading assets and liabilities for the previous quarter, equals: (1) 10% or more of 
the BHCs total assets for the previous quarter, or (2) $1 Billion or more.  
 
(Mortgage Sec. $t - Mortgage Sec. $t-4)/Assetst-4: Year-over-year change (sampled quarterly) in the 
total amount of the outstanding principle balance of 1-4 family residential loans and home equity loans 




Mortgage Loans: Sum of all loans secured by real estate,  scaled by total assets.  
 
Schedule HC-R: 
Variable equal to 1 if bhck1651 > 0 as 




Schedule HC-S: The $ amount of 
mortgage securitization activity is 




Schedule HC-C: bhck1410/bhck2170. 
 
“Other” H.T.M. and A.F.S. Securities (Gov., Agency, & Lower-rated Private-Label H.T.M. and 
A.F.S.  Securities): This variable captures the portion of Held-to-Maturity and Available-for-Sale 
securities held on BHC balance sheets that are government or agency securities. This variable also 
captures the portion of non-highly rated non-agency, non-government (private-label) securities. It is 
calculated as the difference between the total HTM and AFS securities on BHCs balance sheet and the 
total “highly-rated residual” HTM and AFS securities on BHCs balance sheet.  
 
HC-B item 8 (column A and D) – 
Highly-Rated Residual (see 
construction in Appendix A) + HC-D 
item 4c: 
(bhck1754+bhck1773) – Highly-Rated 
Residual (see Appendix A) – bhck3536. 
“Other” Trading Securities (Gov., Agency, & Lower-Rated Private Label Trading Securities): 
This variable captures the portion of trading assets on BHCs balance sheet that are not included in the 
highly-rated residual.  This includes all government and agency securities as well as non-highly rated 
private-label securities held on the trading book. It is calculated as the difference between total BHC 
trading assets and the “all other MBS” portion of trading assets.   
 
HC-D item 12 (Column A) – item 4c 
(Column A): 
bhck3545 – bhck3536.  
 
Prior Returns: BHC buy-and-hold returns calculated from January 2005- January 2006. 
 
(Sec. $t – Sec. $t-4)/Assetst-4: Year-over-year (sampled quarterly) change in the total amount of the 
outstanding principle balance of assets sold and securitized with servicing retained or with recourse or 




Schedule HC-S: The $ amount of 
securitization activity is calculated as 
(bhckb705 + bhckb706 +  bhckb707 + 





Securitization-active Indicator: This variable measures the total outstanding principal balance of 
assets sold and securitized with servicing retained or with recourse or other seller-provided credit 
enhancements.  The securitization active dummy variable is equal to one for banks that have any 




Variable equal to 1 if (bhckb705 + 
bhckb706 +  bhckb707 + bhckb708 + 
bhckb709 + bhckb710 + bhckb711) > 0 
in any year 2003-2006. 
 
Securitization-league-table Indicator: This variable is equal to one for any BHC that was involved 
in the underwriting of any type of securitization, including subprime RMBS, CLOs, CBOs, and CDOs. 
 
Moody’s eMaxx Data Services 
 
Tier 1 Leverage: BHC Tier 1 capital divided by average total assets for leverage capital purposes. 
 
Unused Loan Commitments: Unused portion of residential and commercial real estate loan 
commitments. 
















Figure 1. Dollar Amounts of Holdings of Highly-Rated Tranches.   
This figure plots the aggregate, nominal U.S. dollar amount of holdings of highly-rated tranches through time. Our sample runs from 2002-2008 
and includes all U.S. publicly-traded bank holding companies (BHCs). The plot is created using the “Highly-Rated Residual” measure of highly-
































Holdings of Highly-Rated Tranches44 
 
 
Figure 2. Time Series Plot of Holdings of Highly-Rated Tranches as a Percent of Total Assets.   
This figure plots the holdings of highly-rated tranches as a percent of total assets through time. The sample includes all U.S. publicly-traded bank 
holding companies (BHCs). Banks are deemed “securitization-active” if the outstanding principle balance of assets sold and securitized with 
servicing retained or with recourse or other seller-provided credit enhancements is greater than zero in any quarter between the years 2003-2006.  
Forty-six banks meet this criterion as of January 2002. The remaining banks are characterized as “Non-securitization active.” 
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Figure 3. Time Series Plot of Regulatory “Cushion.” 
This figure plots the regulatory “cushion” of all U.S. publicly-traded bank holding companies (BHCs).  The regulatory cushion is calculated as the 
ratio of Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets, minus 4%.  Banks are deemed “securitization-active” if the outstanding principle balance of assets 
sold and securitized with servicing retained or with recourse or other seller-provided credit enhancements is greater than zero in any quarter 







































































































































































































(Tier 1 Capital/Risk-Weighted Assets) - 4% 
Securitization-Active Non-Securitization Active46 
 
 
Figure 4. Time Series Plot of Total Assets to Risk-Weighted Assets. 
This figure plots the ratio of total assets to risk-weighted assets using a sample of U.S. publicly-traded bank holding companies (BHCs).  The 
sample  includes  all  securitization-active  BHCs  and  a  size-based  matched  sample  of  non-securitization  active  BHCs.  Banks  are  deemed 
“securitization-active” if the outstanding principle balance of assets sold and securitized with servicing retained or with recourse or other seller-






























































































































































































Total Assets/Risk-Weighted Assets 
Securitization-Active Non-Securitization Active Matched Sample47 
 
Table 1. Documenting the Holdings of Highly-Rated Tranches Among U.S. Bank Holding Companies.   
This table reports summary statistics of some measures of holdings of highly-rated tranches: Highly-Rated Residual, Highly-Rated Residual + CDOs, Highly-
Rated Residual + CDOs and Writedowns, and Bottom-up Highly-Rated Tranches. See Appendix 1 for the definition of the variables. Full sample includes all 
U.S. publicly-traded bank holding companies (BHCs). Large trading-asset banks are defined as BHCs with trading assets in excess of $1 Billion or BHCs whose 
trading assets represent greater than 10% of total assets. Non-zero trading asset banks are defined as banks with trading assets greater than $0 and less than $1 
Billion (or with trading assets representing less than 10% of total assets).  Non-trading asset banks are defined as banks with no trading assets. Beginning in the 
second quarter of 2008, BHCs with trading assets in excess of $1 Billion have been required to report the amount of CDOs and  ABSs held in their trading 
portfolio. Panel C reports statistics for the residual measure plus these CDOs and ABSs as in 2008. In Panel D, we also include write-downs on CDOs from 
Bloomberg covering 2006 onwards. 
Full Sample  Large Trading-Asset Banks  Non-Zero Trading Asset Banks Non Trading-Asset Banks Citigroup B of A JPMorgan Chase
Year Obs Mean Med 90th %tile Obs Mean Obs Mean Obs Mean
Panel A: "Highly-Rated Residual"
2002 169 1.29% 0.10% 3.59% 13 3.05% 35 1.68% 121 0.99% 1.96% 1.29% 0.00%
2003 184 1.27% 0.06% 3.40% 13 3.77% 37 1.71% 134 0.91% 2.26% 0.79% 0.20%
2004 205 1.37% 0.02% 3.85% 14 3.76% 36 2.38% 155 0.92% 2.74% 0.94% 0.88%
2005 218 1.50% 0.10% 4.48% 14 4.70% 37 3.11% 167 0.88% 3.54% 1.43% 0.80%
2006 231 1.31% 0.15% 3.13% 14 4.75% 40 2.49% 177 0.78% 4.78% 1.04% 0.63%
2007 224 1.27% 0.20% 3.04% 12 3.18% 47 2.26% 165 0.85% 5.06% 1.73% 1.57%
2008 220 1.13% 0.11% 3.12% 11 2.42% 47 1.52% 162 0.93% 4.39% 2.55% 2.03%
Panel B: "Highly-Rated Residual + CDOs"
2006 231 1.31% 0.15% 3.13% 14 4.76% 40 2.49% 177 0.78% 4.79% 1.05% 0.67%
Panel C: "Highly-Rated Residual + CDOs and Writedowns"
2006 231 1.33% 0.15% 3.14% 14 4.90% 40 2.52% 177 0.78% 5.68% 1.88% 0.69%
Panel D: "Bottom-Up Highly-Rated Tranches"
2002 169 1.11% 0.04% 3.49% 13 2.01% 35 1.56% 121 0.89% 1.18% 1.37% 0.18%
2003 184 1.01% 0.01% 3.15% 13 2.95% 37 1.53% 134 0.67% 1.04% 0.84% 0.26%
2004 205 1.14% 0.01% 2.64% 14 3.09% 36 2.31% 155 0.69% 1.25% 0.52% 0.35%
2005 218 1.26% 0.01% 3.26% 14 4.14% 37 2.80% 167 0.68% 1.85% 1.18% 0.78%
2006 231 1.28% 0.09% 3.17% 14 5.04% 40 2.47% 177 0.72% 3.89% 1.83% 0.64%
2007 224 1.23% 0.14% 3.15% 12 3.56% 47 2.13% 165 0.80% 4.69% 2.56% 1.51%
2008 220 1.03% 0.17% 3.24% 11 2.37% 47 1.32% 162 0.85% 3.89% 3.19% 2.40%48 
 
Table 2. Holdings of Highly-Rated Tranches and Bank Holding Company Stock Returns.   
This table documents the relationship between BHC stock returns and holdings of highly-rated tranches as of Dec 2006. The dependent variable is buy-and-hold 
excess return over the equally-weighted market return from July 1, 2007 through December 31, 2008. Each regression uses a different measure of highly-rated 
holdings. Appendix 1 outlines the construction of the measures of highly-rated holdings as well as the definitions of the main explanatory variables and control 




"Highly-Rated Residual + 
CDOs"




(1) (2) (3) (4)
80th %tile - 100th%tile Highly-Rated Tranche Holdings Indicator -0.137** -0.137** -0.141** -0.083
(-2.284) (-2.284) (-2.341) (-1.280)
60th %tile - 80th%tile Highly-Rated Tranche Holdings Indicator -0.108 -0.108 -0.116 -0.068
(-1.466) (-1.466) (-1.575) (-0.967)
40th %tile - 60th%tile Highly-Rated Tranche Holdings Indicator -0.099 -0.099 -0.089 -0.013
(-1.506) (-1.506) (-1.378) (-0.206)
20th %tile - 40th%tile Highly-Rated Tranche Holdings Indicator -0.091 -0.091 -0.091 0.077
(-0.949) (-0.949) (-0.941) (0.776)
0%tile - 20th%tile Highly-Rated Tranche Holdings (Omitted Group)
Unused Loan Commitments  -1.358** -1.358** -1.357** -1.266**
(-2.402) (-2.402) (-2.389) (-2.201)
Mortgage Loans as % of Total Assets -0.767** -0.767** -0.765** -0.785**
(-2.204) (-2.204) (-2.221) (-2.182)
C&I Loans as % of Total Assets -0.761* -0.761* -0.773* -0.802*
(-1.824) (-1.824) (-1.877) (-1.952)
"Other" H.T.M. and A.F.S. Securities 0.615 0.615 0.620 0.627
(1.470) (1.470) (1.488) (1.443)
"Other" Trading Securities -2.705* -2.705* -2.674* -2.626*
(-1.801) (-1.801) (-1.803) (-1.748)
Log Market Cap -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.009
(-0.270) (-0.270) (-0.228) (-0.446)
Prior Returns 0.167 0.167 0.169 0.176
(1.087) (1.087) (1.096) (1.143)
Market-to-Book 0.113*** 0.113*** 0.112*** 0.107***
(3.107) (3.107) (3.093) (2.923)
Tier 1 Leverage -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 -0.011
(-0.594) (-0.594) (-0.610) (-0.553)
Constant 0.551 0.551 0.538 0.585
(0.922) (0.922) (0.901) (0.924)
Observations 218 218 218 218
Adjusted R-squared 0.237 0.237 0.237 0.226
Measures of Holdings of Highly-Rated Tranches49 
 
Table 3. Are Holdings of Highly-Rated Tranches Explained by Bank Asset Size?   
This table tabulates the results of an OLS regression of our measures of highly-rated holdings on measures of bank size, “other” securities holdings, and other 
control variables. The sample contains the cross-section of publicly traded U.S. BHCs with relevant data as of December 2006. Each regression uses a different 
measure of highly-rated holdings. Appendix 1 outlines the construction of these measures of highly-rated holdings as well as the definitions of the main 
explanatory variables and control variables. Heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics are in parentheses. The symbols ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, 







"Highly-Rated Residual + 
CDOs"




(1) (2) (3) (4)
$0-50 Billion 0.797** 0.797** 0.808** 0.881***
(2.458) (2.459) (2.494) (2.771)
>$50 Billion -0.063 -0.063 -0.056 -0.062
(-1.518) (-1.519) (-1.336) (-1.550)
"Other" H.T.M. and A.F.S. Securities 0.029 0.029 0.030 0.030
(1.170) (1.170) (1.174) (1.238)
"Other" Trading Securities 0.384 0.385 0.357 0.354
(1.063) (1.067) (0.970) (1.031)
Prior Returns -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.011
(-0.514) (-0.513) (-0.510) (-1.144)
Market-to-Book 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
(1.418) (1.416) (1.395) (1.332)
Tier 1 Leverage -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(-1.107) (-1.108) (-1.113) (-0.875)
Constant 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.015
(0.742) (0.742) (0.745) (0.911)
Observations 225 225 225 225
Adjusted R-squared 0.149 0.149 0.152 0.172
Measures of Holdings of Highly-Rated Tranches50 
 
Table 4. “Skin in the Game”: Does Securitization Activity Explain Holdings of Highly-Rated Tranches?  
This  table  tabulates  the  results  of  an  OLS  regression  of  our  measures  of  highly-rated  holdings  on  variables  measuring  a  bank’s  securitization  activity. 
“Securitization-active Indicator” variable in Columns (1) and (2) is equal to one if the outstanding principle balance of assets sold and securitized with servicing 
retained or with recourse or other seller-provided credit enhancements is greater than zero. “Securitization-league-table Indicator” in Columns (3) and (4) is equal 
to one for any BHC that was involved in the underwriting of any type of securitization. “Loan Pipeline” in Columns (5) and (6) calculates the total amount of 
retail and wholesale closed-end first and junior lien loans made on 1-4 family residential properties that were for sale, scaled by total assets, as of December 
2006. In the regressions including the Loan Pipeline, we measure highly-rated holdings as of December 2007 rather than December 2006. The dependent variable 
in Columns (7) and (8), “(Highly-Rated Residual $t – Highly-Rated Residual $t-4)/Assetst-4,” measures year-over-year changes in the amount of holdings of highly 
rated tranches, sampled quarterly from 2002 Q1 through 2006 Q4 (see Appendix 1 – Panel A for a detailed description of the construction of the “Highly-Rated 
Residual” variable). The variable “(Sec. $t – Sec. $t-4)/Assetst-4” in Column (7) is sampled quarterly and is calculated as the year-over-year change in the total 
amount of the outstanding principle balance of assets sold and securitized with servicing retained or with recourse or other seller-provided credit enhancements. 
The variable “(Mortgage Sec. $t - Mortgage Sec. $t-4)/Assetst-4” in Column (8) is sampled quarterly and is calculated as the year-over-year change in the amount 
of the outstanding principle balance of mortgage assets (1-4 family residential loans and home-equity lines of credit) sold and securitized with servicing retained 
or with recourse or other seller-provided credit enhancements.  Control variables are defined in Appendix 1. The sample contains the cross-section of publicly 
traded U.S. BHCs with relevant data as of Dec 2006. Heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics are in parentheses. Standard errors used to compute the T-statistics 



































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Securitization-active Indicator 0.015** 0.015**
(2.178) (2.188)
Securitization-league-table Indicator 0.015 0.015
(0.485) (0.490)
Loan Pipeline -0.010 -0.011
(-0.280) (-0.304)
(Sec. $t - Sec $t-4)/Assetst-4 0.003*
(1.69)
(Mortgage Sec. $t - Mortgage Sec. $t-4)/Assetst-4 0.003**
(1.98)
$0-50 Billion 0.564* 0.574** 0.736** 0.746** 0.722* 0.731* 0.122 0.122
(1.967) (2.001) (2.138) (2.173) (1.911) (1.930) (1.48) (1.48)
>$50 Billion -0.065 -0.059 -0.062 -0.055 -0.009 -0.005 -0.010 -0.010
(-1.565) (-1.383) (-1.577) (-1.386) (-0.544) (-0.328) (1.15) (1.15)
"Other" H.T.M. and A.F.S. Securities 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.011 0.010 -0.004 -0.003
(1.261) (1.265) (1.346) (1.351) (0.629) (0.594) (0.37) (0.37)
"Other" Trading Securities 0.386 0.359 0.311 0.282 -0.027 -0.039 0.048 0.048
(1.071) (0.978) (0.946) (0.841) (-0.259) (-0.361) (1.05) (1.05)
Prior Returns -0.006 -0.006 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.005 -0.005
(-0.527) (-0.523) (-0.649) (-0.647) (-0.686) (-0.688) (1.55) (1.55)
Market-to-Book 0.004* 0.004* 0.004 0.004 0.001 0.001 0.002** 0.002**
(1.755) (1.733) (1.539) (1.517) (0.450) (0.433) (2.24) (2.25)
Tier 1 Leverage -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002* -0.002* -0.001** -0.001**
(-1.238) (-1.244) (-0.996) (-1.001) (-1.676) (-1.683) (2.48) (2.49)
Constant 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.013 0.031* 0.032* 0.014** 0.014**
(0.675) (0.678) (0.724) (0.727) (1.889) (1.903) (2.07) (2.07)
Observations 225 225 225 225 200 200 3,723 3,724
Adjusted R-squared 0.170 0.173 0.150 0.153 0.105 0.110 0.028 0.028
Measures of Holdings of Highly-Rated Tranches
(Highly-Rated Residual $t - Highly-
Rated Residual $t-4)/Assetst-452 
 
Table 5. Does Regulatory Capital Arbitrage Explain Holdings of Highly-Rated Tranches?  
This table tabulates the results of an OLS regression of our measures of highly-rated holdings on proxies identifying 
banks  that  are  likely  to  engage  in  regulatory-capital  arbitrage  activities.  These  proxies  are  an  Asset-backed 
Commercial Paper (ABCP) Activity indicator, change in leverage around the regulation change in 2001, and an 
indicator variable for banks that are subject to market-risk-equivalent capital rules. The construction of each of these 
variables, dependent variables, and controls is detailed in Appendix 1. The regressions in columns (1) and (2) are 
estimated using holdings of highly-rated tranches as of December 2007 and ABCP activity as of December 2006. 
The sample contains the cross-section of publicly  traded U.S. BHCs  with relevant data as of December 2006. 
Heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics are in parentheses. The symbols ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, 
























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ABCP Activity Indicator -0.009 -0.008
(-0.363) (-0.302)
Change in Leverage, 2000 Q4 - 2002 Q4 0.002 0.002
(1.355) (1.316)
Market Risk Equivalent Bank Indicator 0.016 0.015
(0.575) (0.553)
$0-50 Billion 0.803 0.800 0.791* 0.804** 0.665 0.681
(1.572) (1.567) (1.975) (2.007) (1.586) (1.631)
>$50 Billion -0.006 -0.003 -0.061 -0.054 -0.063 -0.056
(-0.375) (-0.177) (-1.513) (-1.325) (-1.567) (-1.376)
"Other" H.T.M. and A.F.S. Securities 0.011 0.011 0.001 0.001 0.030 0.030
(0.834) (0.811) (0.0179) (0.0247) (1.177) (1.181)
"Other" Trading Securities -0.013 -0.027 0.362 0.334 0.322 0.297
(-0.176) (-0.343) (1.018) (0.924) (1.023) (0.918)
Prior Returns -0.010 -0.010 -0.014 -0.014 -0.006 -0.006
(-1.037) (-1.055) (-1.065) (-1.055) (-0.585) (-0.578)
Market-to-Book 0.001 0.001 0.008 0.008 0.003 0.003
(0.914) (0.905) (1.563) (1.534) (1.431) (1.406)
Tier 1 Leverage -0.002* -0.002* -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002
(-1.731) (-1.739) (-0.442) (-0.450) (-1.154) (-1.159)
Constant 0.029** 0.029** 0.015 0.015 0.014 0.014
(2.180) (2.206) (0.481) (0.485) (0.921) (0.919)
Observations 221 221 140 140 225 225
Adjusted R-squared 0.113 0.117 0.135 0.137 0.151 0.154
Measures of Holdings of Highly-Rated Tranches53 
 
Table 6: Do Bad Incentives Explain Holdings of Highly-Rated Tranches?  
This table tabulates the results of an OLS regression of our measures of highly-rated holdings on various proxies of managerial incentives. The construction of 
each dependent and independent variable is detailed in Appendix 1. The sample contains the cross-section of publicly traded U.S. BHCs with relevant data as of 
Dec 2006. Heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics are in parentheses. The symbols ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
 









Dollar Gain from +1% 0.000
(1.099)
Equity Risk (%) -2.696
(-1.337)
CEO Ownership % 7.338
(0.962)
$0-50 Billion 0.833** 0.685 0.918* 0.898* 0.455 0.827* 0.862*
(2.380) (0.978) (1.820) (1.928) (1.189) (1.910) (1.899)
>$50 Billion -0.064 -0.070 -0.067 -0.064 -0.065 -0.066 -0.067
(-1.533) (-1.514) (-1.568) (-1.521) (-1.254) (-1.560) (-1.546)
"Other" H.T.M. and A.F.S. Securities 0.028 0.119 0.083 0.021 0.014 0.028 0.013
(1.074) (0.463) (0.726) (0.367) (0.241) (0.428) (0.224)
"Other" Trading Securities 0.395 0.444 0.382 0.460 0.224 0.363 0.394
(1.093) (1.201) (1.085) (1.182) (0.471) (0.994) (1.056)
Prior Returns -0.007 0.011 -0.004 -0.002 -0.003 -0.004 -0.004
(-0.633) (0.167) (-0.155) (-0.493) (-0.632) (-0.780) (-0.707)
Market-to-Book 0.004 0.006 0.005 -0.016 -0.011 -0.010 -0.003
(1.536) (0.416) (0.764) (-0.781) (-0.535) (-0.464) (-0.154)
Tier 1 Leverage -0.001 -0.003 -0.002 0.010 0.013 0.011 0.012
(-1.077) (-0.370) (-0.300) (1.535) (1.561) (1.548) (1.542)
Constant 0.021 -0.014 0.001 0.016 0.012 0.027 0.007
(0.968) (-0.126) (0.0111) (0.328) (0.217) (0.494) (0.147)
Observations 222 51 67 89 79 79 79
Adjusted R-squared 0.146 -0.033 0.063 0.083 0.140 0.088 0.093
Dependent Variable: "Highly-Rated Residual" Measure of Holdings of Highly-Rated Tranches